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INTRODUCTION

S

hortly over a decade ago, two very exciting developments in the
fields of international law and comparative law (respectively)
whizzed past one another. The first, in the field of international law, was
the publication of a now-classic 1999 symposium issue by the American
Journal of International Law (“AJIL”) where representatives of seven
different methods or approaches to international law wrote upon a single
issue using their approach. 1 This was meant to illustrate the wealth of
insights to be gained from various interdisciplinary, critical, or other approaches to common international law problems. 2 In comparative law, an
event of parallel proportions was the Centennial World Congress of
Comparative Law, held in New Orleans in 2000 to commemorate the
opening of the first World Congress on Comparative Law in Paris in
1900. 3 The 2000 New Orleans conference drew leading comparativists
from the world over to assess the state of the discipline, to examine comparative law’s successes and failures in the twentieth century, and to outline the most pressing areas for inquiry for the coming years.
The two symposia could not have shared more disparate fates. The
AJIL symposium issue, edited by Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, became a bestseller (by standards of American legal scholarship),
commanding several subsequent reissues from 2004 forward. It remains
in print, offering a menu of methodologies for internationalists depending on taste and intellectual or political bend.4 The Ratner/Slaughter
book has become a desktop reference for students and practitioners eager
to acquaint themselves with realism in international relations or looking
for a quick primer on Third World Approaches to International Law
(“TWAIL”). By contrast, the comparative law symposium issue went, by
and large, unnoticed outside the discipline. This is regrettable, but not for
the familiar Cinderella reasons. 5

1. Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 293, 295 (1999).
2. See id.
3. See Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Centennial World Congress on Comparative Law:
Opening Remarks, 75 TUL. L. REV. 859, 862 (2001).
4. Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Method is the Message, in THE
METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 243 (Am. Soc’y Int’l Law, Stud. in Transnat’l
Legal Pol’y Ser. No. 36, Ratner & Slaughter eds., 2004) [hereinafter Ratner & Slaughter,
Method in the Message].
5. See generally Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985) (describing how failure to engage in critical
introspection has relegated comparative law to the status of an underappreciated sibling
in legal academia).
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Ten years on, a group of scholars are now undertaking the delicate task
of weaving together the fields of comparative law and international law.
Recently, a conference organized by a progressive group of doctoral law
students (the Toronto Group 6) presented a panel exploring the field of
comparative international law (“CIL”), or national approaches to public
international law and governance.7 These conferences are indicative of
surging interest in, and potential misuse of, traditional comparative law
techniques, vocabularies, and projects.
In effort to seize on this moment and guide the methodological and
substantive discussion on CIL towards emancipatory ends, it is vital to
address three fundamental issues, or what we shall call roots (the history
of CIL); pitfalls (intellectual traps for the unwary sojourner exploring
CIL); and politics (or the ineluctable moral, distributive, and participatory consequences of CIL projects). We explore these three issues mindful
of a constellation of historical factors that have contributed to the rise of
CIL. Principal among these was the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (“USSR”) twenty years ago and the ostensible elimination of not only socialist law from the grand family of legal systems, but
also of socialist international law from the mindset of international lawyers and practitioners. 8
Section I begins with an examination of the history of CIL, choosing
the creation of the Soviet Union and the concomitant creation of “Soviet
international law” as the starting point of our inquiry. This Section explores the important cross-fertilization between the two disciplines
(comparative law and international law) during the period. Section II
analyzes several important methodological paths available to CIL scholars, including focusing on the study of comparative international legal
histories, CIL institutional histories, and the study of the diffusion of
norms or dominant ideologies. Section III concludes by exploring the
implications of such a study and suggests analytical frameworks for
prospective CIL projects.
6. See Michael Fakhri, Anxieties and Aspirations: A Schematic Note on the Toronto
Group for the Study of International, Transnational and Comparative Law 1–2 (Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No. 11/2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128129.
7. See Toronto Group for the Study of Int’l, Transnational, and Comparative Law,
Call for Papers: Concerning States of Mind, Disturbing the Minds of States (2010),
available at http://torontogroup.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/toronto-group-2010-callfor-papers.pdf [hereinafter Toronto Group]; see also Am. Soc’y Int’l Law & Egyptian
Soc’y Int’l Law, Call for Papers: Are There Regional Approaches to International Law
and Institutions? (2010), available at http://www.asil.org/files/egypt100620.pdf.
8. See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 17–28 (3d ed. 1985).

388

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:2

I. ROOTS: BRIEF HISTORY OF CIL
A common misconception in CIL is that this nascent field is the intellectual product of advances in critical approaches to international law, or
what has elsewhere been called new approaches to international law
(“NAIL”) or ‘newstream,’ 9 and more recently still, TWAIL. 10 This sentiment is heard in any number of conference presentations. 11 As a threshold matter, it is factually incorrect. CIL is not the product of the past
decade. As an academic discipline in the West, the course “comparative
approaches to international law” was taught in the 1970s at University
College London by eminent Russian law scholar William E. Butler.12 An
edited work on international law in comparative perspective was published thirty years ago by Butler in 1980.13 Twenty-five years ago, Butler
also delivered a series of lectures on the field at the Hague Academy of
International Law. 14 His contributions to the methodology of CIL below
are discussed below.
Even the term is far from new. Aside from Butler’s use of comparative
approaches to international law, CIL can be traced to the early 1960s to
describe the competing Western and Soviet international legal orders. 15
The term was recently suggested for the process of comparing interna-

9. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 345 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds.,
2003) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES].
10. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, New Approaches to the History of International Law, 19
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 555, 558–59 (2006); B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES (1993).
11. See, e.g., Toronto Group, supra note 7 (“In the past decade, many scholars have
critiqued this tendency, using historical and biographical methods to examine the place of
subjectivity and situatedness in international law.”).
12. W.E. Butler, Acknowledgments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE vii (W.E. Butler ed., 1980) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE]; W.E. Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12, at 25, 29
n.17 [hereinafter Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method]. In the late
1960s, Butler led a study at Harvard Law School in Russian, Chinese, and American
approaches to international law. See, e.g., W.E. Butler, American Research on Soviet
Approaches to Public International Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 218, 223–24 (1970) [hereinafter Butler, American Research on Soviet Approaches].
13. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12 (surveying
application of comparative method to public international law).
14. W.E. Butler, Comparative Approaches to International Law, 190 RECUEIL DES
COURS 9, 58–61 (1985) [hereinafter Butler, Comparative Approaches].
15. 1 THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER: TOWARD A THEORY OF WAR PREVENTION
227–29 nn.1–11 (Richard A. Falk & Saul H. Mendlovitz eds., 1966).
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tional treaties and provisions, 16 but the more traditional and commonsense use is the one proposed by McWhinney, Butler, and others to describe, in very general terms, competing approaches to international law,
institutions, and governance. 17 This is an important clarification, for as
discussed below, terminological issues are some of the most central
fields of debate in comparative law.
Furthermore, as will be explored, CIL also existed earlier as a discipline in other national traditions. Below, this Article surveys the origins of
CIL in the early twentieth century without any claim regarding earlier
origins of this sub-field. 18 In fact, subsequent histories will surely place
the start of CIL much further in the annals of history (and introduce parallel CIL traditions in the same temporal plane). But, for the present
purposes, the chosen periodization is sufficient to illustrate the promises
and major blindspots inherent in such a study.

16. MARKKU KIIKERI, COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING AND EUROPEAN LAW 305
(2001) (uses the term to mean the “comparison of international treaties and their provisions” but this is assuredly not the best use for such a broad term); Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57 (2011) (using the term “comparative international law” to refer to the way academics, practitioners and national courts seek to identify and interpret international law by engaging in comparative analyses of various domestic court decisions).
17. Edward McWhinney used comparative international law to describe not merely
intra-bloc rivalry over competing international law ‘systems’ during the Cold War, but to
describe the divergent evolution of other systems of international law, such as: (1) traditional international law in the sense of custom-based rules and general treaty law; (2) UN
law, UNSC and UNGA resolutions and decisions of the ICJ; (3) ‘regional’ international
law; and (4) Socialist international law. See Edward McWhinney, Operational Methodology and Philosophy for Accommodation of the Contending International Legal Systems,
50 VA. L. REV. 36 (1964). “The operational problem for the present-day international
lawyer who is genuinely concerned with the attempt to accommodate the contending
legal systems may in some sense seem to reduce to an exercise in comparative law—
comparative international law, if one wishes to be precise.” Id. at 54. McWhinney believed that by doing comparative international law, a U.S. and Soviet legal task force
could find a ‘common core’ of international law where there is or is likely to be broad
consensus and to separate and quarantine areas of controversy and divergence.
18. This is a heuristic choice, not a concrete historical claim. Comparative international law can be said to have started earlier, perhaps as early as the very creation of classic European international law in the seventeenth century, and the attempts by peripheral
non-European states to appropriate or create alternative visions of international law. See,
e.g., Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of
Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475, 521 (2010) (arguing that in the
process of appropriating Western international law, elite non-Western international law
jurists created a “particularistic universalism” conception of the international order).
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A. The Interwar Period and Start of Alternatives
World War I (“WWI”) and the formation of the League of Nations traditionally signify the start of modern international law.19 This period also
coincides with arguably the most significant historical events of the
twentieth century, the Bolshevik Revolution and the formation of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (“RSFSR”), and later the
development of the Soviet Union. The two moments are of course intimately interrelated, and their linkages and nuances have been fought
over by historians, political scientists, and sociologists ever since. The
moments also had great significance for the three disciplines at issue here
(public international law, comparative law, and CIL).
To the field of international law in the West, the Russian revolution
signified a challenge. From its inception, the USSR squarely charged the
architects of the League system and the Versailles Treaty with imperialist
aims and threatened, quite bluntly, to demolish the international legal
order by a series of worldwide workers’ revolutions. 20 Inspired by the
Marxist tradition, the Soviet state proposed an alternative domestic and
global governance model that absolutely rejected longstanding classic
liberal notions regarding private property, free trade, the organic class
system (itself originating in the Aristotelian tradition, but rationalized by
vulgarized interpretations of Charles Darwin’s natural selection theory),
and so on. To traditional comparative law scholars, the Russian revolution produced a great family of law—the socialist legal system—that
would go on to influence dozens of national domestic legal orders
through direct imposition, indirect transplant, and law and development
schemes. 21 As discussed below, the Soviet state introduced a concrete
programmatic proposal for the world’s colonized peoples and exploited
workers. 22 From its inception, it offered solidarity, material aid, and organizational resources to national liberation movements in opposition to
European imperial powers. Equally important, it offered a theoretical and
strategic alternative to the predominant global legal order. These developments stretched traditional disciplinary bounds, creating new fields
(international political economy) but also for the first time, putting comparative law and international law into tension with one another. Whereas traditionally, comparative law rested on the assumption of legal pluralism and early twentieth century international law rested on an assump19. Again, this is not the place to discuss the relevance of 1492, 1648, 1815, 1885 or
other dates potentially integral to the development of international law. That lively debate
is better held elsewhere.
20. See infra note 57.
21. See A. KH. SAIDOV, COMPARATIVE LAW 199 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 2003).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 242–51.
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tion of universality, these bright distinctions no longer held true. From
this point forward, the need for CIL (defined as the study of alternative
approaches to dominant governance paradigms) was born.
B. A Historical Taxonomy
How is CIL different from traditional comparative law, or traditional
international legal theory, or the study of international legal history(ies)?
In its most basic form, CIL, like basic comparative law, intends to satisfy our base instinct to catalog, shelve, sort, and understand. 23 CIL is
simply another form of legal taxonomy, built on the premise that its
unique form of classification will facilitate an improved understanding of
the law. 24 CIL offers a chance to take stock of an increasingly pluralized
and fractionalized global legal order, the ever-more complex maze of
international, regional, and bilateral agreements, both hard and soft. As
Emily Sherwin has observed, significant benefits can result from a useful
categorization of the law:
[O]rganisation of law into categories . . . facilitate[s] legal analysis and
communication of legal ideas. . . . [A] comprehensive formal classification of law provides a vocabulary and grammar that can make law more
accessible and understandable to those who must use and apply it. It assembles legal materials in a way that allows observers to view the law
as a whole law. This in turn makes it easier for lawyers to argue effectively about the normative aspects of law, for judges to explain their
decisions, and for actors to coordinate their activities in response to
25
law.

23. VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW 10–11 (2002).
24. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 5 (1997) [hereinafter Mattei, Three Patterns]
(“[Taxonomy] provides the intellectual framework of the law and it makes the law’s
complexity more manageable.”); see also Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation: Is
There a “Field”? A Tribute to Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1427, 1430–32
(2006); Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 243 (2000)
(“Gaining knowledge of a subject is largely a matter of learning how to classify the subject and its constituent elements.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 477, 484 (2006) (contending that a good taxonomy “is not simply an attempt to
catalog existing laws,” but advances our understanding of the area of the law and thereby
“provide[s] a useful framework for its future development”); GEOFFREY C. BOWKER &
SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1
(1999) (“To classify is human.”); 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW xxxi–ii (Peter Birks ed., 2000)
(“The search for order is indistinguishable from the search for knowledge.”).
25. Emily Sherwin, Legal Positivism and the Taxonomy of Private Law, in
STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW 103, 119 (Charles Rickett & Ross Grantham eds., 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Mattei, Three Patterns, supra note
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A perfect taxonomy of international legal orders, then, offers a coherent
way to sort among them, to distinguish patterns and commonalities, and
to observe faultlines. There is a reason, after all, why René David and
Rudolf Schlesinger’s systems and families analysis continues to offer
very rough, but useful, guidance fifty years on. 26 In its most elementary
form, for instance, breaking legal systems into common law, Islamic law,
civil law, and socialist (and now post-socialist) law is a useful pedagogical heuristic, indispensable for introducing students to different traditions
despite the variances within the ‘families.’
Of course, comparativists know all too well that building a perfect
framework for the world’s legal systems is not only exceedingly difficult, but may in fact be impossible. Attempts to construct grand comparative law narratives on ostensibly objective criteria have been shown
to mask and replicate traditional historical infelicities. 27 Thankfully, with
the accelerating move away from the nation-state as the fundamental jurisdictional unit of comparison—Germany’s liability rules for nuisance 28
versus South Africa’s giving way to micro-level anthropological studies
and ethnographies of decision making and adjudication processes 29—
there are fewer and fewer calls for a perfectly coherent taxonomy, at
least from the ranks of academic comparativists.30

24, at 6 (“Taxonomy plays an important role in transferring knowledge from one area of
the law to another.”).
26. Compare RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXTS,
MATERIALS (1950), with UGO MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA, ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S
COMPARATIVE LAW (7th ed., 2009) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW].
27. See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Encountering Amateurism: John Henry Wigmore and
the Uses of American Formalism, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW
94, 118 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001) [hereinafter Riles, Encountering Amateurism] (discussing early comparativist John Henry Wigmore’s attempt to analyze the Japanese legal
system as a whole, what Riles refers to as “legal corporeology”).
28. See, e.g., Timothy Swanson & Andreas Kontoleon, Nuisance, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF L. & ECON. 380, 396 (2008).
29. See generally LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES
(2001) (discussing dispute settlement mechanisms in indigenous Zapotec communities);
see also infra text accompanying notes 327–29.
30. Contrast this with the universalizing, highly structured, and ostensibly coherent
comparative law project afoot at the World Bank—the Doing Business Reports. See generally Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765
(2009) (considering the role of the Doing Business Reports in the field of comparative
law); Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the
Doing Business Project, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007) (analyzing and assessing the
effectiveness of the Doing Business Reports).
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Moreover, just as international law is undergoing a “turn to history” for
theoretical inspiration,31 comparative law has also sought to make a “turn
to politics” (and to history) 32 to seek out direction and purpose. 33 The
conscientious wings of both disciplines, it seems, are essentially living
out the story of the prodigal child returning home after realizing the
world was far more complex than they had imagined. Naturally, since
both have been out in the world, it makes sense to swap notes, exchange
stories, find shared experiences, and identify common enemies they met
along the road. 34 To close the metaphor, however, it is important to realize that there may not be any difference between the comparativist, the
internationalist, and the comparative internationalist. They may all have
traveled the same path, seen the same patterns, and returned home the
same way, simply at different times. Taxonomies allow us to share these
experiences. The taxonomic function of CIL, therefore, is not to stake out
a new line of intellectual inquiry in the field of public international law,
but rather, to map out ongoing and related intellectual projects within
comparative law and international law and to bring them together to a
coterminous end.
Proceeding on this general plane, the modest role of a comparative international lawyer, therefore, should be that of a liaison, a networker, or a
matchmaker. Comparative international lawyers are not meant to be legal
philosophers or great legal historians weaving tales of how nations used
to solve functionally equivalent legal problems in unique ways by reference to archives or diplomatic histories. Rather, they are institution
builders, conference organizers, and networkers. They are strategists,
advisors, and diplomats who intuitively understand that every Finnish
Yearbook of International Law, Israeli Yearbook of International Law,
and Palestine Yearbook of International Law contains subtly (or radically) distinct approaches to identical problems; that state practice varies
even in similar international fora because of differences in legal culture,
language, and mentalité. As is shown in the Section on methodological
minima, 35 CIL practioners should aspire to embrace plurality among the
world’s legal systems, not to gloss over it. Consistent with the general
31. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS (2002) (experimenting with the development of international law from a historical and political lens).
32. See generally RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Annelise Riles
ed., 2001) [hereinafter RETHINKING THE MASTERS] (a collection of works discussing
modern comparative law issues through a historical lens of the development of comparative law).
33. Id.
34. As to why they ventured on the road out alone and not side by side, that is a matter for another day.
35. See infra Section II.B.
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Hippocratic-like oath of the now ordinary comparativist, the goal of the
CIL lawyer must be limited, to be interdisciplinary without claiming interdisciplinarity, 36 to understand and to translate foreign approaches to
international norms and institutions without seeking to transform them.
Three historical figures, Evgeny A. Korovin, John N. Hazard, and
W.E. Butler help illustrate this spirit.
1. Evgeny A. Korovin & Socialist International Law
In the history of Soviet approaches to international law, an often overlooked, but very important early figure is Evgeny A. Korovin (1892–
1964). 37 Unlike the eminent Soviet legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis—
whose contributions to Marxist legal theory have stood the test of time—
Korovin has been perennially neglected by Western scholars, who view
him as a chameleon and whose career is seen as apologetic and mercurial, partly because he escaped Stalin’s purges. 38 The late American comparativist and Sovietologist John N. Hazard, for instance, remarked that
“no . . . praise of Korovin as a pioneer ever appeared from any official
pen.” 39 This is surprising, as Korovin was one of the leading international lawyers in the Soviet Union, 40 a Soviet member of the American Society of International Law, 41 and charged with expounding Soviet legal
36. See generally Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and
the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 597 (1994). Riles argues that
claim of interdisciplinarity has lost much of its rhetorical force, but that interdisciplinary
scholarship is helpful in that it discloses tension between “reflexive and normative modes
of engagement with legal problems.” Id. at 597.
37. Pamiati Evgeniia Aleksandrovicha Korovina [In Memoriam Evgeny Alexandrovich Korovin], 1 PRAVOVEDENIE 201 (1965) [hereinafter In Memoriam], available at
http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:rPNB0jSAUwUJ:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as
_sdt=0,33.
38. Stunningly, for instance, Piers Beirne’s Revolution in Law: Contributions to the
Development of Soviet Legal Theory, 1917-1938 (Piers Beirne ed., 1990), does not have a
single mention of Korovin. Cf. Zofia Maclure, Soviet International Legal Theory—Past
and Present, 5 FLETCHER F. 49, 49–54 (1981) (providing a good summary to Korovin’s
work). Grewe offers one citation of Korovin’s Das Völkerrecht (International Law of the
Transition Period) for the proposition that a “fundamental conception of communism
[was] that the existing international legal order was only a provisional and transitory
system of practical intercourse between socialist and capitalist states.” WILHELM H.
GREWE, EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 594 (internal citation omitted). For Grewe’s
retelling of the Soviet transition period (1919–1939), see id. at 604–05.
39. Hazard, Foreword to PASHUKANIS, SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW
xii (Piers Beirne & Robert Sharlet eds., Peter B. Maggs trans., 1980).
40. In Memoriam, supra note 37; Maclure, supra note 38, at 51, 53.
41. DIPLOMATICHESKII SLOVAR’: T.1.: A-K [DIPLOMATIC DICTIONARY, P. 1: A-K] (A.
Ia.
Vyshinskii,
S.A.
Lozovskii
eds.,
1948),
available
at
http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/dic_diplomatic/688/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
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theory to American scholars. 42 For the first decade of his career as an
international lawyer, Korovin’s writing was interpreted as the official
pronouncement of the Soviet state. 43 No less of an authority than Vladamir E. Grabar 44 had called Korovin “the leading Soviet international law
theorist.” 45 Yet until now, little has been known about his life.
Korovin was born in 1892 in Moscow to a middle-class family. 46 His
father was a doctor and the head of the First Moscow Society on Sobriety, an anti-alcoholism clinic and advocacy group. 47 He was a prodigious
student and assisted his father with publications. 48 By age twelve, Korovin began translating the poetry of French poets Lemaitre, Mallarmé, and
Gautier. 49 Details about his student life in Moscow are unclear, though
an unpublished autobiography may reveal more about his formative
years. 50 Korovin graduated from Moscow State University in 1915 51 dur-

42. See, e.g., Eugene A. Korovin, Soviet Treaties and International Law, 22 AM. J.
INT’L L. 753 (1928); Eugene A. Korovin, The Problems of the International Recognition
of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in Practice, 19 IOWA L. REV. 259 (1934); Eugene A. Korovin, The Second World War and International Law, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 742
(1946) [hereinafter Korovin, The Second World War]; David J. Bederman, Appraising a
Century of Scholarship in the American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
20, 34 n.101 (2006) (citing Korovin’s 1928 article in AJIL and acknowledging AJIL’s
publication of the “occasional Soviet publicist”).
43. L. Ratner, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo v Marksistkom Osveshchenii [International
Law in Marxist Light], 6 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO [SOVIET STATE] 128, 130 (1935)
(acknowledging that the only scholarship available to foreign observers on Soviet international law was Korovin’s, leading to the misconception that his scholarship represented
the official Soviet doctrine).
44. Vladimir E. Grabar (1865–1956) was one of the leading Russian international law
scholars, whose career spanned both the Imperial and Soviet eras. Among his principal
works was THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RUSSIA (1647–1917) (W.E. Butler
trans., 1990). See W.E. Butler, Introduction to PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1,
1–2 (W.E. Butler ed., 1990) [hereinafter PERESTROIKA].
45. Kozhevnikov, Na Samom Otstalom Uchastke Na Fronte Sovetskogo Prava [On
The Most Laggard Wing in the Battlefield of the Soviet Law], 3 SOVETSKOE
GOSUDARSTVO I REVOLIUTSIIA PRAVA [SOVIET STATE L. & REVOLUTION] 146, 150 (1930)
(mocking Grabar’s praise of Korovin).
46. See
Evgenii
Korovin,
VEKPEREVODA.COM,
http://www.vekperevoda.com/1887/korovin.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The standard biography from the Institute of Soviet Law does not provide details
on this period of his life. See Evgeny Alexandrovich Korovin, 1 SOVETSKOE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [SOVIET STATE & L.] 133 (1965); see also W.E. Butler, Soviet
International Legal Education: The Pashukanis Syllabus, 2 REV. SOCIALIST L. 79, 85,
n.34 (1976) (describing the unpublished autobiography). Korovin’s personal papers are
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ing the height of Russia’s campaign in WWI. It is unclear what his position was during the war or during the revolutionary period, but it is
known that he began teaching in Moscow shortly after the revolution. 52
By 1923 (at age 31), Korovin was a full professor of law at Moscow
State University and an assistant of the Institute of Soviet Law (Institut
Sovekogo Prava) of the Russian Association of Scientific Institutes of the
Social Sciences the predecessor of the Institute of State and Law of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences. 53 With respect to his international credentials, and language skills, there is indication that Korovin read English
and possibly German, was fluent in French, and monitored Western literature on Soviet law. 54
His earliest works on international law are a series of articles in the
journal Sovetskoe Pravo, from the very first issue in 1922. 55 Between
1922 and 1924, Korovin published articles on the principle of most favored nations, 56 League of Nations, 57 rebus sic stantibus, 58 and diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union by other nations. 59 By the end of the
1920s, following the reorganization of the legal research institutes and
law faculties, Korovin was elevated to a professorship in international
law at Moscow State University, and taught international law and international relations at a large number of Moscow institutes of higher learning, including the Moscow Juridical Institute and the Moscow Diplomatic Academy. 60
held at the St. Petersburg affiliate of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
fund No. 1552, available at http://www.rusarchives.ru/guide/lf_ussr/kom_kor.shtml.
51. See In Memoriam, supra note 37.
52. Id.
53. See L.E. Lapteva, Istoriia Instituta [History of the Institute],
http://www.igpran.ru/about/index.php (last accessed Feb. 15, 2011).
54. See Letter from John N. Hazard to Walter S. Rogers, Dir. of the Inst. of Current
World Affairs (Nov. 24, 1934).
55. E.A. Korovin, Inostrannaia Filantropicheskaia Deiatel’nost’ v R.S.F.S.R.I Pravovye Formy [Foreign Philanthropic Activities in the R.S.F.S.R. and its Legal Forms], 1
SOVETSKOE PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 108 (1922).
56. Е.А. Korovin, Uslovie Naibol’shego Blagopriiastvovaniia v Dogovorah
R.S.F.S.R. [The Most Favored Nation Principle in Treaties of the USSR], 3 SOVETSKOE
PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 30, 30–31 (1923).
57. Е.А. Korovin, Liga Natsii I Evoliutsiia [The League of Nations and Its Evolution],
4 SOVETSKOE PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 36, 36–43 (1923).
58. Е.А. Korovin, Ogovorka Rebus Sic Stantibus v Mezhdunarodnoi Praktike
R.S.F.S.R. [The Principle Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Practice of the
R.S.F.S.R.], 6 SOVETSKOE PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 52 (1922).
59. Е.А. Korovin, Mezhdunarodnoe Priznanie S.S.S.R.I Iuridicheskie Ego Posledstviia [International Recognition of the U.S.S.R. and Its Legal Consequences] 9
SOVETSKOE PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 76, 76–86 (1924).
60. See In Memoriam, supra note 37.
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In 1924, the year of Lenin’s death 61 and the year Pashukanis published
his influential General Theory of Law and Marxism, 62 Korovin published
International Law of the Transition Period. 63 The initial print run was
5,000 copies, significant for the first Soviet attempt to formulate a theory
of international law and international relations. In 1924, Korovin published a short work on Soviet treaties, International Conventions and
Acts of the New Era. 64 One year later, he published a teaching manual,
Contemporary Public International Law, 65 which is likely the first CIL
textbook. In 1929, a second edition of International Law of the Transition Period was translated into German. 66 In addition, between 1924–
1928, Korovin published close to ten articles and book reviews on international law in the journal Sovetskoe Pravo.
Korovin’s corpus of early work is important to our study for several
reasons. First, as one of the two leading authorities on international law
during the 1922–1939 period, he had a tremendous influence on an entire
generation of Soviet international law scholars and practitioners. 67 The
wide distribution of his works and the large print runs and reissues signify that Korovin’s theories, despite being criticized by the Pashukanis
camp, were actually quite widely read and taught. Second, Korovin’s
work offers the first glance into early Soviet comparative law, for Korovin routinely relied on ‘bourgeois’ examples and Western legal systems
61. 7 VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 264 (15th ed.
2005).
62. Evgeny Pashukanis, Obshchaia Teoiia Prava I Marksizm: Opyt Kritiki Osnovnykh Iuridicheskikh Poniatii [The General Theory of Law and Marxism] (1924), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW (P. Beirne & R. Sharlet eds., Peter
B.
Maggs
trans.,
1980),
available
at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/pashukanis/1924/law/index.htm.
63. Е.А. KOROVIN, MEŽDUNARODNOE PRAVO PEREKHODNOGO VREMENI
[INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD] (1924) (Russ.) [hereinafter KOROVIN,
ILTP].
64. Е.А. KOROVIN, MEZHDUNARODNYE DOGOVORY I AKTY NOVOGO VREMENI
[INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND ACTS OF THE NEW ERA] (1924).
65. Е.А. KОROVIN, SOVREMENNOE MEZHDUNARODNOE PUBLICHNOE PRAVO
[CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW] (1926) [hereinafter KOROVIN, CIPL].
Contemporary public international law was devoted to explaining contemporary European-American conceptions of international law, rather than providing a systematic Soviet perspective. Korovin meant for it to be read simultaneously with his International
Law of the Transition Period for an understanding of the Soviet position on given issues.
Id. at 3–4.
66. E.A. KOROWIN, DAS VOLKERRECHT DER UBERGANGSWEIT (1929).
67. See Lauri Malksoo, The History of International Legal Theory in Russia: A Civilizational Dialogue with Europe, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 211, 226 (2008); see also Earl A.
Snyder & Hans Werner Bracht, Coexistence and International Law, 7 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 54, 59 (1958).
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to make his point about Soviet legal theory. 68 John Hazard, who regularly met with Korovin in the course of his studies at the Moscow Juridical
Institute, noted that Korovin was the first to introduce the study of Anglo-American law to Russia through his lectures on the topic in the early
1930s. 69
Korovin devoted great energy to the study of English and American
law, going so far as to translate the 1872 California Code into Russian. 70
To some, Korovin’s comparative work may not seem rigorous and may
appear to contain mostly Marxist-inspired platitudes about Western legal
systems. For instance, Korovin taught that English law, though it was
capitalist in function, was in actuality, feudal in form71—though why this
distinction mattered was not clear to Hazard. 72 The Whigs and the propertied class controlled the courts in England, Korovin taught, they vigorously maintained the archaic form of the judicial system, adding to the
mystique and “hypnosis of law.” 73 However, not having studied in England, Korovin’s observations were derived from his own interpretation of
secondary texts.
Nevertheless, despite the understandable opposition to bourgeois jurisprudence and amateuristic comparisons, 74 Korovin actually allowed for
the introduction and transplantation of foreign legal concepts and systems into the Soviet Union. Korovin pointed out that the 1934 Soviet
Civil Code, for instance, was modeled on the Swiss Civil Code and was
compiled in just five months at the Intitute of Soviet Law. 75 Likewise,
Korovin introduced elements from the German legal academy to influence Russian law teaching, both substantively and with respect to teaching method. 76 Korovin was deeply familiar with the three reigning
68. See, e.g., Korovin, The Second World War, supra note 42, at 747–48; Mintauts
Chakste, Soviet Concepts of the State, International Law and Sovereignty, 43 AM. J. INT’L
L. 21, 31 (1949); Malksoo, supra note 67, at 226 (quoting a passage from Korovin explaining the break of Soviet international law from that of Europe).
69. John N. Hazard, Fragments of Lectures on the History of International Relations
29 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Bakhmeteff Archive, Columbia University
Library System) [hereinafter Hazard, Fragments].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. The term ‘amateurism’ is by now a term of art in comparative law, and should not
be read as derogatory. It refers to lack of language skills, or improper definition of the
subject of study in comparative projects. See, e.g., Riles, supra note 27, at 94–100, 104
(pointing out Wigmore’s deficient language skills), 118 (discussing legal systems analysis and legal corporeology).
75. Hazard, Fragments, supra note 69, at 36.
76. Id. at 29.
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‘scientific’ schools of international law of the time—the natural law tradition, the historical school (Savigny), and the school of Rudolf von
Jhering—and was especially influenced by the third, as this represented
to Korovin the closest approximation of the realist theory of international
law and international relations.77 Korovin saw that Jhering “looked at
law as the juridical defense of interests” and that law was, at its core,
political strength, though he criticized Jhering for failing to see the class
nature of law despite having read Marx.78
To understand the value of Korovin’s work, it is important to appreciate that he was the first to apply Marxism to international law79 and the
first to offer a critical comparison of Western international law with the
emerging Soviet system. 80 A brief overview of two of his un-translated
works illustrates his scholarly contributions.
International Law of the Transition Period opens by explaining the
novelty of the task: the first attempt, in Russian or international literature, to study problems of international law in the transition period between capitalism and communism. 81 For the Soviets, the core problem of
the transition period was how to open daily diplomatic-level interactions
with representatives of the Western powers without compromising the
Soviet rejection of bourgeois law and the Soviet repudiation of the “legal
inheritance” (read: debt) of the Tsarist and Kerensky governments. 82 In
these first negotiations between the West and representatives of the Soviet Republic, Korovin admits, Soviet diplomats reverted to a familiar (or
what he calls, ‘stereotypical’) ‘phraseology’ and reliance on ‘commonly
accepted’ bases of international law, going so far as to rely on Imperial
Russian treaties in support of Soviet agendas.83 Therefore, one of the first
problems Korovin sought to address was the continuity in forms between
capitalist and communist international legal orders.84

77. Id. at 29–32.
78. Id. See generally RUDOLF VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husik
trans., Macmillan 1921) (1914) (a great work by the legal philosopher Ihering, considering how purpose is the foundation of legal systems).
79. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 28–35.
80. See KOROVIN, CIPL, supra note 65.
81. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 1.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. Korovin later successfully defended his position of maintaining continuity of
terminology between the Russian and Soviet periods on practical grounds. Since the Soviet interpretation of such terms would be qualitatively different from bourgeois interpretations, it made no difference what terms were used. See also KOROVIN, CIPL, supra note
65.
84. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63.
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Secondly, notwithstanding Soviet diplomats’ use of the familiar language and concepts of bourgeois international law,85 Western diplomats
began to lodge steady protests that, despite Soviet willingness to negotiate, the USSR was violating customary law, particularly with respect to
the repudiation of the Kerensky and Tsarist debt. 86 Korovin immediately
saw this as proof of his earlier indeterminacy theory. 87 That is, despite
the use of common forms and attempts to agree on substantive points,
international jurists on both sides of the negotiating table would be able
to interpret their obligations in radically different ways. Rather than use
international law substantively or “on the merits,” Korovin realized the
immense practical applicability of his indeterminacy critique. 88 In what
he called legal instrumentalism, Korovin openly argued for elastic legal
standards as a way to both undermine the bourgeois concept of law and
to afford the young Soviet state room to operate in a hostile foreign environment. 89
Unlike Pashukanis, it seems Korovin was not concerned with theorizing an internally coherent Marxist social order; his goal, rather, was to
apply a Marxist critique to existing international law and institutions and
to provide a guide for Soviet practice. Korovin was fully aware of the
difficulty of reconciling Marxism with law and legal institutions and devised his transition theory to accommodate both law and its eventual disappearance.90 But he elided these subtleties, beginning, like Lenin before
him, with the axiom that where there is society there is law (gde obsh85. Korovin gives as an example the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference of
1922, which was headed by G.V. Chicherin, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs
from 1918 to 1930. KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63; see also Maclure, supra note 38, at
50.
86. ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: DEBT AND REPUTATION IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 133 n.52 citing Herschel
Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Debt Repudiation Rouses All Nations: Joint Protest
Made by 19 Envoys in Petrograd—Bonds Used as Currency, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 20, 1918)
(on file with authors); see also id. at 107–52 (describing the joint protest issued by each
country with representatives in Soviet Russia in 1918 to the debt repudiation decree).
87. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63.
88. Boris N. Mamlyuk, Russia & Legal Harmonization: An Historical Inquiry into IP
Reform as Global Convergence and Resistance, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 8) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Mamlyuk, Legal
Harmonization].
89. Е.А. Kоrovin, K Peresmotru Osnovnykh Poniatiĭ Mezhdunarodnogo Prava, [Towards a Reexamination of the Main Tenets of International Law], 18 SОVЕТSКОЕ PRАVО
[SOVIET L.] 25, 26 (1925) (arguing for a need to develop “sufficiently elastic legal forms
capable of accommodating two polar legal orders”) [hereinafter Korovin, Towards a
Reexamination].
90. KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 6.
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chezhitie—tam pravo). 91 To Korovin, this maxim is not only the product
of legal dialectics, but constituted a sociological fact. 92 Thus, international law and diplomacy were necessaries so long as states existed. More
concretely, as long as the USSR was surrounded by imperialistic states
with whom it remained necessary to have relations, 93 such relations
would need to be grounded in a legal basis.94 To Korovin, it was scholastic to theorize the essence of law, when in actuality—after realizing that
all law is politics and strength—it was important to assure the USSR’s
place in the world by way of legal mechanisms. 95 The only remaining
question was of substance and adapting legal instruments to attain Soviet
interests.
Korovin’s main thesis is that international law was a temporary compromise between the USSR and other states in different stages of economic development on the road to a world revolution. 96 The implications
of this compromise were dire: “as long as the U.S.S.R. is surrounded by
capitalist states,” declares Korovin, “it must remain in legal ‘isolation’—
it cannot become either an object or subject of the bourgeois trapeze.”97
This required the negation of practically all fundamental international
law concepts, including the sources of international law, and its subjects,

91. Korovin, Towards a Reexamination, supra note 89.
92. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 6.
93. The “capitalist encirclement” theory was, in the view of American diplomats,
incompatible with a desire for permanent peaceful coexistence. See GEORGE F. KENNAN,
MEMOIRS, 1925–1950, at 547 (1967) (Excerpts from a Telegraphic Message from Moscow, dated February 22, 1946, quoting Stalin’s remarks to a delegation of American
workers: “In course of further development of international revolution, there will emerge
two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which
tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline
towards capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of the world economy
will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in the entire world.” Id. (emphasis added)).
94. The word for ‘relations’ in Russian is further divided into multiple variants (vzaimootnoshenie, otnoshenie, snoshenie). Vzaimootnoshenie refers to interrelations; otnoshenie is relations generally, whereas snoshenie means something between interaction
and contact. See W.E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN-ENGLISH LEGAL DICTIONARY 27, 145, 210
(2001).
95. See Maclure, supra note 38, at 53.
96. For a different restatement of the transition theory, see I.А. ISAEV, ISTORIYA
GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA ROSSII [HISTORY OF STATE AND LAWIN RUSSIA] (1996); see also
I.А. ISAEV,TOPOS I NOMOS: PROSTRANSTVA PRAVOPORIADKOV [SPACE LAW AND ORDER]
348 (2007) (“A Russian federation was conceptualized as a transition stage on the way to
an eventual political union, a period during which people would trounce national (ethnic)
differences, and progress towards world revolution.”).
97. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 44.
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objects, and institutions. 98 To Korovin, even the most entrenched sources
of international law—treaties—were unreliable as objective determinants
of state conduct. 99 Korovin routinely pointed out the indeterminacy of
particular treaties, showing that the same terms were used by opposing
parties to signify contradictory concepts.100
At the same time, Korovin was a consummate realist and pragmatist.
Mindful of political disagreements as potential roadblocks to cooperation, he outlined a dualistic system of international law in which countries could agree on apolitical matters (for instance, international public
health and epidemics, defense of international historical monuments, or
artwork), while maintaining intellectual opposition on other issues. 101
Korovin’s title for the former category was international administrative
law, 102 a theory that continues to have purchase with respect to completely uncontroversial sub-fields of international law, such as international
laws concerning postal carriage. 103 Korovin was also the author of the
Soviet tripartite theory of international law, which divided international
law into three camps: law between socialist states, 104 law between capitalist states vis-à-vis each other, and law between socialist states and capitalist states. 105 Perhaps most importantly, Korovin realized the tremendous practical and theoretical value to be gained from devising a
theory of perpetual transition, although he never formally identified it as
such.
98. The chapters are: (1) International law in the system of Soviet law, (2) International law of the transition period in the history of international relations, (3) Essence and
nature of international law of the transition period, (4) The state as the subject of international law, (5) Organs of international relations, (6) International treaties, (7) Main issues
in the law of war, (8) Conclusion. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63.
99. Id. at 15–16; see also Chakste, supra note 68, at 27.
100. Korovin gives as an example the negotiations between Richard von Kühlmann
and Trotsky leading to the Brest-Litovsk treaty. KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 13.
The meanings of terms like ‘self-determination’ and ‘peace without annexation,’ were
self-determined by parties to the negotiations. In other words, socialist/Russian negotiators attached their own meanings to these terms, without reference to or belief in universal meanings or principles attached to them.
101. Id. at 15.
102. See id.; KOROVIN, CIPL, supra note 65.
103. See KOROVIN, CIPL, supra note 65.
104. The idea of an independent international law between socialist states is not different from the idea of an international law proper as law “between (European) states that
shared similar ideas about statehood and its social functions.” MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, THE
GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS 282 (citing Pillet’s Le droit international public and distinguishing between European states versus non-European entities based on the fact that
non-Europeans lacked the advanced degree of civilization necessary to understand the
idea of State functions).
105. See Maclure, supra note 38, at 52.
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This theory of perpetual transition effectively underpinned the theory
(or at least, the ethos) of Soviet exceptionalism until the collapse of the
USSR. 106 It is striking that in the whole corpus of Korovin’s work there
is absolutely no indication that socialism would arrive at any proximate
date or that the length of the transition even mattered. Similar to Pashukanis, it seems Korovin understood that socialist international law would
exist so long as the USSR remained obligated to negotiate and deal with
capitalist states.107 As Korovin wrote in his preface to International Law
of the Transition Period, the five year experience of war and agreements
between the socialist Soviet state and capitalist states was an insignificant period of time in the realm of international relations.108 Transition
was going to take a long time; accordingly, socialist international law
could remain in a state of permanent transition, similar to the notion of
‘permanent exception’ popularized by Carl Schmitt and his contemporary appropriators and critics. 109
Korovin’s book Contemporary Public International Law reiterates
many of the themes of International Law of the Transition Period but is
much more heavily criticized, possibly because of its intended use as a
teaching manual. 110 David Levin, a disciple of Pashukanis at the Communist Academy, attacked Korovin precisely for ignoring larger theoretical questions.111 “From a theoretical point of view,” Levin wrote, “the
book is lacking a Marxist methodology and even evidences a certain
dogmatism.” 112 According to Levin, Korovin limited himself to “traditional dogmatic formulation of the main theoretical questions pertaining
to international law (resembling any regular bourgeois work).”113 Levin
especially criticized Korovin’s treatment of the USSR as a quasi-subject
106. The extent to which the Soviet Union claimed exceptional status in international
law after WWII is open to debate. However, for examples of late Soviet exceptionalist
rhetoric in the waning days of the USSR, see G.I. Tunkin, Politics, Law and Force in the
Interstate System, 219 RECUEIL DES COURS 227, 292, 337 (1989) [hereinafter Tunkin,
Politics].
107. See Maclure, supra note 38, at 52–55.
108. KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 4.
109. See Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s
Theory of Emergency Powers and the “Norm Exception” Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1825, 1827 (2000).
110. Compare KOROVIN, CIPL, supra note 65, with KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63.
111. See John N. Hazard, D. B. Levin’s Aktual’nye Problem Teorii Mezhdunarodnogo
Prava [Current Problems of the Theory of International Law], 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 165,
165 (1976).
112. D. B. Levin, Retsenziia: Korovin, Sovremennoe Mezhdunarodnoe Publichnoe
Pravo, [Review: Korovin, Contemporary Public International Law], 1 REVOLUTSIA
PRAVA [REVOLUTION L.] 225, 226 (1926).
113. Id.
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under international law, simultaneously bound by international treaties,
and at the same time, because of the unique extraterritorial class nature
of the Soviet experiment, resembling something of a proletarian movement rather than a traditional territorial state.114 Contrary to Korovin,
Levin argued that:
Practically speaking, the USSR, as the only socialist state, is required to
guard itself from the capitalist world by way of legal barriers (sovereignty, equality) and at the same time uphold the international law
form of statehood even more intensively than bourgeois states, which,
115
in the period of imperialism lose much of their significance.

Yet Levin’s view, which would come to dominate Soviet international
legal theory from the mid-1930s until the zenith of ‘classical’ Soviet international law in the post-WWII period, portrayed a gross misunderstanding of the strategic implications of Korovin’s indeterminacy and
transition theories.
Pashukanis disciples also criticized Korovin in a series of articles in
the Encyclopedia of State and Law. 116 In the realm of international law,
the main disagreement was that Korovin claimed the Soviet Union could
create new international legal forms. 117 According to Hazard, the Pashukanis camp “argued that Korovin was philosophically wrong [because]
the international law being applied by Soviet diplomats could not be
something new. International law could be only what it had been under
the influences of capitalism.” 118 But these aspects of the debate missed
the broader basis of disagreement—namely, whether there was a tactical
advantage to the Soviets in claiming the existence of an exceptional outlook on international law. To the Pashukanis camp, this argument was a
non-starter, as all state relations mirrored relations between commodity
owners, whether or not those relations occurred between capitalist states
and ostensible ‘socialist’ ones. Therefore, the notion of socialist international law, as somehow unique from general international law, was a logical impossibility. To Korovin, however, comparing competing international law traditions to one’s own offered a useful frame for a prolonged
attack on the competing system.

114. Id. at 227.
115. Id.
116. See Chakste, supra note 68, at 24; see, e.g., infra text accompanying note 120.
117. See John N. Hazard, The Soviet Union and International Law, 1 SOVIET STUD.
189, 190 (1950) [hereinafter Hazard, The Soviet Union and International Law], available
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/148828; see also Maclure, supra note 38, at 52.
118. John N. Hazard, Socialism and International Public Law, 23 COLUM. J.
TRASNAT’L L. 251, 255 (1984) (emphasis added).
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Contemporary Public International Law was, in other words, the first
large-scale attempt by a Soviet jurist to present a systematic critique of
the Western view of international law. For all the critical insight, the ultra-leftist Pashukanis camp 119 missed the brilliant advance that Korovin
made. Read together, International Law of the Transition Period and
Comparative Public International Law describe how, despite being bitter
ideological foes, two states modeled on radically different economic
models could, and would, coexist in parallel universes and cooperate
with each other on matters of common concern. This tremendous insight
would, of course, go on to form the basis for the doctrine of coexistence 120 and, eventually, the doctrine of permanent peaceful coexistence
after the Cuban Missile Crisis.121 However, perhaps partly because of the
rapid development of international law in the USSR and the West after
World War II (“WWII”), Korovin’s contributions to peaceful coexistence were never credited.
Yet, here was a comparative international lawyer, par excellence, who
had resisted the common Marxist urge to draw caricatures of Western
models and institutions, 122 to perform simple comparison by contrast, or
to define himself solely in opposition to an imagined bourgeois foe, rather than a realistic assessment of a powerful adversary. 123 Though he
was subject to intense criticism at home and abroad, Korovin’s stance
offers three lessons for the understanding of CIL. First, Korovin’s experience shows that it was possible to set aside ideological disagreements
with representatives of competing systems in an effort to build institutional links with rival theoretical and political schools. Second, as Korovin demonstrated, CIL could reveal inner tensions within the competing
system, serving as a useful base for critique. Lastly, Korovin’s CIL work
119. Michael Head, The Passionate Legal Debates of the Early Years of the Russian
Revolution, 14 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 23–27 (2001) (describing the theoretical
orientations of Pashukanis, Stuchka, and other leading Soviet legal theorists).
120. Eugene A. Korovin, The Conception, Sources and System of International Law, in
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE U.S.S.R. INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 16 (Dennis Ogden trans., 1960).
121. See John Quigley, Perestroika and International Law, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 788,
789–90 (1988).
122. See, e.g., Michael Head, The Rise and Fall of a Soviet Jurist: Evgeny Pashukanis
and Stalinism, 17 CAN. J.L. JURISPRUDENCE 269, 284–86 (discussing Pashukanis’s mockery of Western models and responses to his writings); Charles J. Reid, Jr., Tyburn, Thanatos, and Marxist Historiography: The Case of the London Hanged, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 1158, 1187 (1994) (criticizing a Marxist scholar for drawing a caricature of the
British criminal justice system).
123. See, e.g., KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 1; JOHN N. HAZARD, RECOLLECTIONS
OF A PIONEERING SOVIETOLOGIST 24 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter HAZARD, RECOLLECTIONS]
(stating that Pashukanis argued that all law was bourgeois).
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evidences the pitfalls from corporeological accounts of a competing system, highlighting the need for narrow subject inquiry and methodological
rigor.
2. John N. Hazard & Comparative Law
Unlike Korovin, John N. Hazard (1909–1995) is familiar to most comparative law scholars, Russian law experts, and American internationalists. Hazard’s contribution to the field of CIL is indebted to Korovin, as
much of his scholarship draws upon the letters and notes he wrote while
auditing Korovin’s international law courses at the Moscow Juridical
Institute from 1934–1937. 124 These materials, now preserved in the
Bakhmeteff Archive at the Columbia University Library, not only provide a glimpse into how international law was taught in 1930s Soviet
Union, they also shed an important light on method and methodology
when thinking about CIL. 125
Hazard’s career as a Sovietologist began following his graduation from
Harvard Law School in 1934 when he was sent to Moscow as an Institute
of Current World Affairs fellow to attend, and report on, Russian law
courses. 126 Hazard took three courses related to international law while a
student, all under Korovin: introduction to international law; history of
international relations; and public international law.127 Beyond the class
notes, Hazard also provided brief sketches of Korovin in correspondence
with his supervisors in the U.S. 128 Hazard’s initial impression of Korovin
was that he was a “scholarly man[,] . . . well-schooled in the Marxist attitude, and the reasons given by the authorities for [Soviet foreign policy
decisions].” 129 In addition to classes, Hazard met with Korovin on a
weekly basis in the latter’s home, learning Russian and allowing Korovin
to practice his English language skills. 130
Hazard began his long and prolific scholarly career while still in Moscow, publishing articles in the Columbia Law Review131 and the Ameri124. See Hazard, Fragments, supra note 69; see also Oscar Schachter, In Memoriam:
John Newbold Hazard (1909-1995), 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 584 (1995).
125. See Hazard, Fragments, supra note 69.
126. Schachter, supra note 124, at 584.
127. See HAZARD, RECOLLECTIONS, supra note 123.
128. Schachter, supra note 124, at 584.
129. Letter from John N. Hazard to Walter S. Rogers, Dir. of the Inst. of Current
World Affairs (Nov. 4, 1934) (discussing the introduction of a course on the history of
the development of international law, the first of its kind in Russia).
130. See John N. Hazard, Foreword to EVGENY PASHUKANIS, SELECTED WRITINGS ON
MARXISM AND LAW 273 (P. Beirne & R. Sharlet eds., 1980), available at
www.marxists.org/archive/pashukanis/biog/memoir.htm.
131. John N. Hazard, Soviet Law: An Introduction, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (1936).
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can Journal of International Law. 132 After returning from Moscow in
1937, Hazard enrolled in a doctorate program at Chicago University,
studying comparative law under the supervision of Max Rheinstein.133 In
1938, Hazard publicized the expulsion of Pashukanis and the ensuing
attempts to “cleanse” Soviet international law of his impure theories.134
After completing his doctoral training at Chicago in 1939, Hazard joined
a law firm in New York City, but with the outbreak of WWII he took a
position with the U.S. government, where he was assigned to the Soviet
desk in the Division of Defense Aid Reports. 135 As part of his duties, he
helped negotiate the conditions under which the Soviet Union became a
major recipient of the Lend-Lease program. 136
Hazard ultimately became deputy director of the Soviet branch of the
Lend-Lease Administration, gaining the friendship of America’s postwar foreign policy elite, among them George Kennan, Dean Acheson,
and Averell Harriman. 137 As an expert on the USSR, Hazard accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on his secret mission to China in
May, 1944 through Eastern Siberia.138 The following year he was chosen
as an expert on Soviet law to assist Justice Robert Jackson in preparing
the prosecution of Nazi leaders to be brought before an international tribunal for war crimes. 139 These experiences gave Hazard an unmatched
command of not only Russian law, but also the inner workings of diplomacy, international courts, and institutions.
After WWII, Hazard entered the legal academy at Columbia University, where he remained until his death. 140 Columbia so prized his background that it offered him the rare honor of a tenured position to start. 141
He immediately drew on his Moscow training (and notes) to prepare
teaching manuals for his students at Columbia. His post-War publications ran the gamut from public law and Soviet constitutional theory,
criminal law, family law, and of course, Soviet international relations
and international law. 142
132. John N. Hazard, Cleansing Soviet International Law of Anti-Marxist Theories, 32
AM. J. INT’L L. 244 (1938) [hereinafter Hazard, Cleansing].
133. Schachter, supra note 124, at 584.
134. See Hazard, Cleansing, supra note 132, at 244.
135. See Schachter, supra note 124, at 584; see also John N. Hazard, Soviet Legal
Studies Pioneer, 20 COLUM. U. REC. 24, 86 (1995) [hereinafter Hazard, Pioneer].
136. Schachter, supra note 124, at 584.
137. Id. at 585.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Hazard, Pioneer, supra note 135.
142. See id.
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For the purposes of this Article, the most striking aspect of Hazard’s
work on Soviet international law was its sincere attempt to project a neutral view on the Soviet position and its philosophical origins.143 Hazard’s
writings on Marxism showed deep sensitivity for the inner tensions and
political pressures in which the Soviet jurists were working. He plainly
understood the irreconcilable positions taken by Soviet scholars in defense of party decisions and he could sense the personal disenchantment
those scholars felt when they had to renounce their positions weeks,
months, or years later. Hazard’s mindfulness of these tensions was both
descriptive and analytical. He understood the paradox of so-called
‘Marxist law’—that any law, as such, would mimic the logic of capital
relations—but Hazard also understood the intellectual, institutional, and
historical web that made exposing this precarious symmetry impossible
for the Soviet jurists, including the later Pashukanis.144
Precisely because of these sentiments, and in the heightened atmosphere of McCarthyism, it was even feared Hazard had “gone native” and
was complicit in the global communist conspiracy to overthrow the U.S.
“from within.” 145 He was investigated by the House Un-American Activities Committee, but was ultimately cleared.146 Paradoxically, following
this episode, the USSR would not issue Hazard an entry visa to the Soviet Union, a fact he did not reveal publicly to many people. 147 A victim
of the hyper-politicization of the disciplines of international and comparative law in the Cold War period, Hazard’s experience teaches a practical
lesson confronting potential CIL scholars today—despite best attempts to
find a neutral, objective, or ‘scientific’ base for comparison, it is always
possible to expose an underlying set of existing legal/political traditions
or perhaps even an ideological taint.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Hazard read with optimism the anonymous leading article in the September 1956 Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i
143. See, e.g., Hazard, The Soviet Union and International Law, supra note 117 (carefully discussing the development of Soviet interest in international law).
144. See id.; see also Hazard, Cleansing, supra note 132, at 244, 248.
145. See William Partlett, Re-Classifying Russian Law: Mechanisms, Outcomes and
Solutions for an Overly Politicized Field, 2 COLUM. J.E. EUR. L. 1, 23 (2008).
146. See id.; see also MEDFORD STANTON EVANS, BLACKLISTED BY HISTORY: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY AND HIS FIGHT AGAINST AMERICAN ENEMIES
169 (2007); STEPHEN F. COHEN, RETHINKING THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE: POLITICS &
HISTORY SINCE 1917, at 17 (1985).
147. See Marshall D. Shulman, Biographical Memoirs: John Newbold Hazard, 142
PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 140, 142 (1998) (explaining his relationship with the Soviet Union after the war); Boris N. Mamlyuk, Russia’s Second Twenty-Years’ Crisis (19892009): The Restoration of International Law (2011) (unpublished PhD dissertation) (on
file with authors) [hereinafter Mamlyuk Dissertation].
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Pravo, urging a reevaluation of the work of the interwar period. 148 To the
scholarship of international law, Hazard hoped that a reexamination
would put an end to the spinning of “fine theories,” and focus work on
“specific problems” rather than the core “problem of the conflict between
states of differing economic systems.” 149 Hazard understood how little
good would flow from setting up ‘clashes of civilizations,’ from feeding
into the mania of communism versus capitalism, good versus evil, us
versus them. 150 Thus, he focused his life’s work on debunking these
myths, on teaching several generations of scholars to think critically
about the Soviet ‘other,’ and to understand the inner tensions, conflicts,
and incongruities within the Soviet system through as pragmatic, realistic, and apolitical a lens as possible. 151 This was the great lesson he
learned from the American realist school of the 1930s under Manley O.
Hudson and Roscoe Pound, and the Soviet realist school of Korovin; it
was perfectly fine to immerse oneself in the ‘Other’s’ legal culture, to
establish institutional and professional links between warring systems, 152
and to conceptualize the nature and functions of international institutions
(like the League of Nations) from radically different perspectives. 153
3. W.E. Butler’s CIL Jurisprudence
The third pivotal figure in the development of CIL in the twentieth
century is eminent Russian law scholar, Professor William E. Butler. The
author of more than one hundred books (monographs, edited works, and
translations) and over three thousand total publications (and counting) on
Soviet, Russian, and Commonwealth of Independent State (“CIS”)
law, 154 Butler hardly needs introduction to most international and comparative lawyers. A quick biography and overview of his main works on
CIL helps contextualize the methodological discussion that follows.
Butler was born in Minnesota in 1939 and completed his undergraduate studies at American University’s School of International Service in

148. John N. Hazard, Pashukanis is No Traitor, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 385, 386–88, 386
n.2 (1957).
149. Id. at 388.
150. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer
1993, at 22.
151. See Schachter, supra note 124, at 584.
152. For instance, Hazard developed a strong professional relationship with G.I. Tunkin who would go on to become the leading Soviet international lawyer of the post-WWII
era. See id.
153. See John N. Hazard, “New Thinking” in Soviet Approaches to International Politics and Law, 2 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. REV. 1, 13–15.
154. W.E. BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (2005).
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1961. 155 Butler then attended the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies (“SAIS”), taking Jerome Cohen’s and John Hazard’s course on Chinese, Soviet, and comparative law. 156 After receiving his MA in 1963 from Johns Hopkins, Butler enrolled at Harvard Law
School where he continued studying Soviet law under Harold J. Berman. 157 Butler returned to SAIS for his doctoral studies, completing a
dissertation in 1970 on the “Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea.” 158
Understanding Butler’s institutional and academic lineage is vital, for it
explains the similarities in comparative approaches of the three exemplary CIL scholars.
In 1967 and 1968, Butler began teaching as a lecturer on the Soviet
portion of a Harvard course titled “Soviet, Chinese and Western Approaches to International Law.” 159 The heavily subscribed course was cotaught by Jerome Cohen and Hungdah Chiu (on Chinese approaches), 160
Harold Berman and Butler (on Soviet approaches), and Richard R. Baxter (on American approaches). 161 Employing a combination of textual
analysis and functionalism 162 from the point of departure of a standard
U.S. international law syllabus, 163 the experts on Soviet and Chinese law
would draw on foreign doctrinal and practice materials to answer how
each nation would approach the given topic. 164 In 1970, Butler was elevated to a readership in comparative law at University College London
(“UCL”), 165 and from 1975, he led a graduate-level seminar, “compara-

155. William
E.
Butler,
PENN
STATE
LAW,
http://law.psu.edu/faculty/resident_faculty/butler (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Biographical Note: Ph.D. Dissertations, 29 INT’L ORG. 909, 917 (1975).
159. W.E. BUTLER, Acknowledgements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12, at vii.
160. Some years later the two scholars published a two-volume documentary treatise
on Chinese approaches. See 1 JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S CHINA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974).
161. W.E. BUTLER, Acknowledgements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12, at vii; Butler, American Research on Soviet Approaches,
supra note 12, at 224; W.E. Butler, Justice in Russia: Soviet Law and Russian History, 42
EMORY L.J. 433, 440 (1993) [hereinafter Butler, Justice in Russia].
162. Butler, Justice in Russia, supra note 161, at 440.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. International Law & Organizations: Faculty and Staff, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.,
THE PAUL H. NITZE SCH. OF ADVANCED INT’L STUDIES, http://www.saisjhu.edu/academics/functional-studies/international-law-orgs/faculty.htm#Butler
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2011).
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tive approaches to international law.” 166 The UCL course was not heavily
subscribed and was only offered intermittently for five or six years. 167
Butler’s subsequent CIL work built directly on these teaching experiences. In 1977, Butler selected essays on CIL for publication in a standalone volume, International Law in Comparative Perspective (“ILCP”),
the first English-language work on comparative approaches to international law. 168 ILCP brought together seventeen works, including essays
by McDougal, Schwarzenberger, and Gutteridge, 169 and offered a valuable introduction to the comparative method as applied to international
law, especially with respect to comparative histories of international law.
Butler went on to develop his own indispensible methodological insights,
drawing on and rejecting many of the theories proposed by these very
scholars.
Butler openly rejected the artificial divide set by the earlier interwar
generations of comparativists and internationalists.170 Thus, Butler rejected as anachronistic Gutteridge’s and other comparativists’ disinclination to engage with either private or public international law.171 The
posture of pre-WWII international lawyers was similarly antediluvian,
Butler argued. 172 Because of the mainstream international law preoccupation with nation states, formalist reliance on treaties for positive law,
and overarching spirit of universality, there was hardly a need to study
how states internalized international obligations, or exhibited general
principles. 173 In addition to being factually counterintuitive, such postures undermine the idea of custom as a traditional source of international
law.

166. Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, supra note 12, at 29 n.17.
167. Thomas Carothers, Book Review: Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit de
La Haye [Collected Courses of the Academy of Law of The Hague], 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
374, 379 (1988).
168. W.E. BUTLER, Acknowledgements, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12, at vii.
169. Id. at v, vi.
170. See W.E. BUTLER, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12, at 1–2.
171. Id. at 1; see also H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY & RESEARCH (2d ed. 1949) [hereinafter
GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW] (explaining the origins and meaning, purposes, and
value of comparative law).
172. See W.E. BUTLER, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12, at 2.
173. Id. at 1.
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Butler also rejected the pragmatic, policy-oriented, comparative style
of the American legal realists because it constrained the potential scope
of inquiry to only like systems.
Comparison has been viewed primarily as a means, or technique, to be
employed in the service of law reform, in the proper application of foreign law by the courts, in the international harmonization or unification
of private law, and the like. Although it need not necessarily do so, this
orientation has contributed to an emphasis on studying those legal orders reasonably proximate in levels of development and sophistica174
tion . . . .

To Butler, postwar politics meant that CIL would have to engage in far
broader socio-legal comparisons, going beyond realist functionalism to
encompass a number of related fields. 175 Butler called this a form of
“know thine enemy syndrome . . . the need to comprehend the basic philosophical, historical, sociological, and political premises of a foreign
legal system.” 176 Accordingly, purpose driven CIL meant going beyond
‘hard’ comparisons between, say, American and Soviet foreign affairs
law. CIL study had to embrace the ancillary fields of legal theory, culture, and profession in the respective states. 177 The key methodological
challenge was identifying the purposive strategy—the why behind the
comparative project—which would reveal what needed to be compared.
Like the Ratner/Slaughter collection,178 International Law and the
Comparative Method sought to present a menu of methodological approaches for studying how Soviets understood international law and,
equally if not more important, how Soviets investigated the study of international law in the West. 179 The proper scope of CIL, in Butler’s opinion, was not limited to one approach, but included, when appropriate,
the study of the legal profession, legal language, the obstacles (real or
anticipated) to municipal effectuation of international legal arrangements, 180 comparison of international legal histories, or how nations developed to have distinct approaches to given international institutions. 181
In sum, Butler emphasized the experimental and non-dogmatic nature of

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, supra note 12, at 26.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
Id.
See generally Ratner & Slaughter, Method in the Message, supra note 4.
See Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, supra note 12.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 36.
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comparison and embraced the overarching spirit of “hoped for broader
cooperation, dialogue, and exchange.” 182
Set against pre-Cold War and immediate post-WWII geopolitical realities, Butler’s perspective on CIL was indeed forward thinking. Decolonization, 183 the end of the Vietnam War (1975), 184 the waning of détente
against the USSR, 185 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) 186
made it vitally important to understand how other states intended to use
existing international process to gain stronger positions in the global
power race. Butler was completely right to reject the universalism/absolutism of the interwar period—Gutteridge’s comparative style
and Lauterpacht’s international sensibility—as “inadequate and obsolete.” 187 He was also right to reject the righteous post-WWII policyoriented jurisprudence that sought to advance a personal conception of
the good life against all others. In this sense, Butler’s approach to CIL
was similar to Hazard’s in that it rejected the spinning of “fine theories,”
or grand narratives, regarding the development of either Soviet or Western international law doctrine.
But in dismissing the earlier crude methodologies, Butler’s articulated
replacement method was fraught with uneasy inner tensions. This is evident in several points. First, there is inevitable role conflict between Butler’s archetypal scholarly comparativist—the substantive knowledge
seeker—and the pragmatic policy comparativist—who understands that
“these matters . . . are of more than academic or historical concern” 188
and who has a duty to inform policy makers of what she knows about the
foreign legal culture in question.189 Second, while Butler seems comfortable with the idea of regional or even continental approaches to international law, 190 he is also intimately conscious of the localized and cultural-

182. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
183. See David Strang, Global Patterns of Decolonization,1500–1987, 35 INT’L STUD.
Q. 429, 437 (1991); see also 3 COLONIALISM, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 465
(15th ed. 2005).
184. 12 VIETNAM WAR, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 361 (15th ed. 2005).
185. Robert G. Kaiser, U.S.-Soviet Relations: Goodbye to Détente, 59 FOREIGN AFF.
500, 500 (1980).
186. 28 UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
1017 (15th ed. 2005).
187. Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, supra note 12, at 2.
188. Id. at 36.
189. The conflict between the comparativist as an objective knowledge seeker and the
comparativist as a policy advisor is a longstanding debate in comparative law literature.
See RETHINKING THE MASTERS, supra note 32, at 5–18.
190. Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, supra note 12, at 36–37.
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ly contingent training process for would-be international lawyers. 191 Yet,
Butler is silent on how a would-be CIL scholar should divine regional
trends from particularized sources (language, culture, history, etc.).
International Law in Comparative Perspective was followed in the early 1980s by yet another innovative project with significant ramifications
for CIL. “In late 1983 a groundbreaking Protocol of Cooperation [“Direct Link”] was concluded between the Faculty of Laws, University College London . . . and the prestigious Institute of State and Law [“ISL”] of
the USSR Academy of Sciences.” 192 Together, Professor Vladimir N.
Kudriavtsev (ISL) and Butler arranged for a series of symposia between
representatives of the common law and socialist law traditions 193 to take
place in London and Moscow, with the hosting side paying the reasonable conference costs. 194 The cooperation agreement led to a series of academic visits over the next eight years and colloquia on a range of substantive topics. 195 Naturally, the colloquia covered the topics of comparative and international law and the status of these disciplines in the respective countries. 196 Authors from both sides submitted concrete comparative studies on substantive issues and offered thoughts on methodological
questions confronting the two disciplines.197
Different methodological approaches were also offered in Butler’s
1990 edited work discussing the impact of perestroika on international
law. 198 The approaches can be loosely labeled as, inter alia, Soviet positivist/functionalist (G.I. Tunkin), 199 Critical Legal Studies and literary
191. Id. at 34.
192. 9th Annual Aleksanteri Conference 2009, Cold War Interactions Reconsidered,
Talking Across the Fence: Cold War Academic Cooperation in the Legal Sphere, UNIV.
OF HELSINKI (Oct. 29–31, 2009), http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/conference2009
/abstracts/henderson.html.
193. See W.E. Butler, Acknowledgments, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM:
HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, at vii (W.E. Butler & V. N. Kudriavtsev
eds., 1985) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM].
194. See Protocol on Scientific Co-operation between University College London and
the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in YEARBOOK ON
SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS 388 (W.E. Butler ed., 1987).
195. See W.E. Butler, On the History of International Law In England and Russia, in
THE NON-USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 3–10 (Butler ed., 1989).
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. PERESTROIKA, supra note 44. Perestroika (literally, restructuring) refers to a historical period in late Soviet history (1985–1991) marked by radical economic liberalization and political reorganization in the USSR, which ultimately led to the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
199. See G.I. Tunkin, On the Primacy of International Law in Politics, in
PERESTROIKA, supra note 44, at 5.
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theory (J.A. Carty), 200 systems analysis (D.I. Feldman), and a recurring
policy-based methodology. 201 Yet even in the collection of articles on
perestroika and international law, the essays are divergent, and there is
no consensus on what comparative method as applied to international
law really means. By 1990, at least five different concepts, defined by
their goals, were evoked to explain CIL: (1) comparison of various systems of international law in different historical epochs—the historicist
goal, (2) identifying common values and general legal principles common to all people/nations—the universalist mission, (3) comparison of
international organizations and institutions in their lawmaking or implementation aspects—the institutionalist goal, (4) drawing upon comparative method in a Marxist framework to compare international legal rules
in relation to different social or economic systems—the Marxist approach, and (5) to simply understand and classify different approaches to
international law—the taxonomic approach. 202
It is immediately apparent that none of the above branches of CIL
represent a comparative research or analytical methodology; rather, they
represent an expanded or alternative domain for traditional comparative
study. 203 What, then, does a CIL methodology actually entail? What did
CIL scholars actually need to do?
Butler’s own suggestions can be found in his 1985 Hague Lectures on
the topic of comparative approaches to international law. 204 To Butler,
200. See J.A. Carty, Changing Models of the International System, in PERESTROIKA,
supra note 44, at 13.
201. See D.I. Feldman, New Trends in the Theory and Methodology of International
Law, in PERESTROIKA, supra note 44, at 31. See generally PERESTROIKA, supra note 44.
202. See generally W.E. Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, supra note 12, at 29; Mattei, Three Patterns, supra note 24 (introducing different classification systems and explaining the value of taxonomies).
203. In this way, comparative international law is no different from basic comparative
law. Comparative international law simply applies existing comparative method to study
the diverse approaches to international law. That these differing approaches exist is taken
as given. This pluralism of outlooks on international law and institutions is derived logically from plurality of national approaches to substantive legal fields, ethics, values, etc.
In other words if it is taken as given the complexity and indeterminacy of a single language in a given domestic legal system and the guaranteed protection of philosophical
and moral pluralism in many societies, the permutation of hundreds of languages, cultures, conflicting legal systems and ontological views produces literally thousands of
competing approaches to international view. Every person, group, and state are thus entitled to a unique interpretation of international law; however, the great many of these
views become irrelevant from the standpoint of more powerful interpreters. For an excellent summary of how theoretical pluralism operates, along with a comprehensive review
of comparative law literature, see generally WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA 40–68 (2d ed. 2006).
204. Butler, Comparative Approaches, supra note 14.
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the project entailed nothing short of a grand meta-narrative that would
include:
The historical experience of a state in coming into being and in the patterns and mode of diplomatic relations with others; its geopolitical
frontiers; its cultural, political, economic and ancestral links with foreign entities; its sense of political, religious, or ideological mission; its
capacity to exert military, economic, or political influence over other
States either directly or through emulation and inspiration; its techniques of formulating and executing foreign policy; together with its
political, administrative, economic and legal institutions, concepts of
law and methods of legal reasoning and discourse are all components,
amongst others, of a national style in international law; . . . a compara205
tive perspective [is] essential.

To comparativists, the above list evokes Zweigert & Kötz’s famous invocation of Rabel, demanding that future comparativist compare all possible factors affecting the law. 206 But how does one make sense of these
factors and influences? Is there a rank, an order of importance, or method
for including everything?
Butler (like Hazard and Korovin before him) does not offer a conceptual flowchart or cascading guide for how to assess influences such as
economic constraints versus legal culture or political versus historical
influences. 207 It may be impossible to rank these complex influences, or
it may be contingent on a number of other factors; besides, each comparativist would likely employ his own preferred rank. However, the actual
methodology for CIL is precisely the hoped for “broader cooperation,
dialogue, and exchange” that Butler advocated. 208 As Butler wrote in the
introduction to the first work product of the Direct Link between the
UCL and ISL,
[L]egal studies originating in bilateral symposia of the nature described
here are a veritable genre of legal literature of their own, to be measured against the past, the tenor of the times, the constraints inherent in
205. Id. at 81.
206. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 36 (Tony Weir trans.,
Oxford 3d ed. 1998) (1977).
207. Cf. PETER DECRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 235–39 (2d ed.
1999) (offering a flowchart for comparative analysis, including the need to: (1) “Identify
the problem and state it as precisely as possible,” (2) Identify the jurisdictions being
compared and their legal families, (3) Decide what primary sources of law you will need,
(4) Gather the relevant materials, (5) Organize materials according to the legal philosophy and ideology of the system being investigated, (6) “Map out the possible answer to
the problem,” (7) Analyze the intrinsic value of the legal principles, (8) Form conclusions).
208. Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, supra note 12, at 31.
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the medium, and the possible unexploited possibilities of that medium.
Direct links hold out the promise of collaborative or sustained legal research over an extended period of time, if required. . . . It remains for
209
the parties concerned to make the most of the opportunity.

Put another way, what Butler and his counterparts at the ISL orchestrated
in their Direct Links was CIL. Or to rephrase it in anthropological terms,
by meeting his Soviet counterparts, Butler was building an expert ethnography 210 of Soviet international lawyers and, by extension, gaining a
clearer appreciation for the broadly conceived complexities of Soviet
approaches to international law. As noted legal anthropologist Laura
Nader would argue, Butler’s immersion worked partly because he was
not borrowing “decontextualized and dehydrated” research methodologies, 211 but rather embarking on a good faith encounter that simply happened to work. 212 Like Korovin and Hazard before him, Butler was living out the method 213 of CIL by going beyond his encyclopedic knowledge of Soviet doctrine, going beyond the positive law, in favor of faceto-face engagement, by hosting an earnest conversation or clash between
the leading representatives of two apparently disparate systems. The full
import (and Butler’s influence as chief choreographer) of this particular
CIL project deserves greater study, but for the time being, this Article
considers CIL in the post-Cold War context.
C. Post-Cold War Fragmentation in Comparative Law & International
Law
The lessons to be drawn from the above biographical histories may
seem intuitive, perhaps even banal. Indeed, the moral thus far is rather
general—we should realize that different ‘systems’ (nations, states,
peoples, cultures, etc.) view things differently, and we should approach
the study of these differences with an open mind. But, the deeper claim is
that contemporary CIL has much to learn from the first generation of CIL
in the Cold War era. So, why is it important to situate the current revival
of CIL against the larger backdrop of the Cold War (and interwar) theoretical debates? Why has the emerging CIL discipline chosen to overlook
209. W.E. Butler, Introduction, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note
193, at ix–x (emphasis added).
210. Laura Nader, Moving On—Comprehending Anthropologies in Law, in
PRACTICING ETHNOGRAPHY IN LAW 190, 198–99 (June Starr & Mark Goodale eds., 2002).
211. Id. at 199 (discussing common failures of interdisciplinarity).
212. Id. at 193.
213. See William Twining, Comparative Law and Legal Theory: The Country and
Western Tradition, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 21, 57 (Ian Edge ed.,
2000) (noting that “serious comparative study is more like a way of life than a method”).
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twentieth century CIL projects involving Soviet approaches? This is
doubly confusing when viewed in light of the recent revival of Marxist
approaches to international law. 214 How can Marxists neglect nonPashukanian Soviet approaches, and why do leading critical voices condone this ignorance? Are these strategic choices, ways to avoid appearing orthodox or pro-Soviet? 215 Or is a deeper ambivalence towards the
Soviet legacy at play?
Because answers to the latter questions (concerning why crits and
Marxists avoid engaging with Soviet Approaches to International Law
(“SAIL”) would dwell on the speculative at this stage), those questions
are left for a later date. But to explore the central claim of this Article—
that, for good or bad, Soviet approaches continue to matter—it is important to briefly survey the state of international law in the post-Cold War
era and to highlight several perennial challenges, starting with the immediate post-1989 era.
Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, a
number of scholars (in the West and the Soviet bloc) anticipated the radical impact perestroika would have on international law. 216 Without delving too far into the literature, it is sufficient to point out the most significant development—namely, the Soviet concession and willingness to
ascribe to a monist, unitary international legal order. 217 This took the
form of multiple changes, including the removal of objections to compulsory International Court of Justice jurisdiction under six international
human rights agreements, 218 attempts to establish direct links with a

214. See CHINA MIÉVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004) (engaging Marxist international law theory as a legal form).
215. See Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 AM. LEGAL
STUD. ASS’N F. 32, 32–33 (1982) (suggesting that an implicit assumption of any discussion involving Gramsci is that one is classically Marxist without appearing Soviet). For
an illustration of how scholars attempt to sever the appearance of sympathy to Marxism
while discussing Marxist ideology, see James Fry, Legitimacy Push: Towards a Gramscian Approach to International Law, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 307, 308 n.4
(2008).
216. See, e.g., PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT ANGLO-SOVIET
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anthony Carty & Gennady Danilenko eds., 1990);
A.P. Movchan, The Concept and Meaning of Modern International Law and Order, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 123, 124 (W.E. Butler ed., 1987);
G.G. Shinkaretskaia, International Adjudication Today in the View of a Soviet International Lawyer, in PERESTROIKA, supra note 44, at 245. For a more complete review of the
literature, see Mamlyuk Dissertation, supra note 147.
217. G.G. Shinkaretskaya, International Adjudication Today in the View of a Soviet
International Lawyer, in PERESTROIKA, supra note 44, at 251.
218. Id. at 245.
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number of international economic organizations, 219 and the incorporation
of international legal standards—general principles of international
law—into domestic legislation as normative and substantive justifications for reform. 220
The West interpreted these sweeping reforms as the end to international law and institutions serving as ideological battlegrounds. 221 Around
the early 1990s, many shared a sincere hope that the United Nations
(“UN”) would finally evolve into what its framers had hoped—the conscience of the world and a forum for the peaceful resolution of international disputes. 222 For example, at the UN Security Council, the Soviet
cooperation with the U.S. over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 223 was seen as
ushering in a new era of international security cooperation.224 With the
ideological confrontation in the past, G.I. Tunkin enthusiastically praised
perestroika for renewing faith in hope, progress, and most importantly,
reason as the universal basis for a universal international law. 225 With the
final collapse of the USSR 226 and Russia’s peaceful withdrawal of troops
from the majority of former Soviet republics (with the exception of small
‘peacekeeping’ contingents in territories like Moldova, Ukraine, and several other states), 227 it certainly seemed plausible that international law
was entering a new epoch.
Faith in neo-Kantian Reason as the basis for a perpetual peace did not
last long, however. By the late 1990s, with NATO’s bombing raids in the
former Yugoslavia, 228 a string of attacks directed against the U.S. and

219. See KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD
ECONOMIC ORDER 187 (1987) (discussing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
220. PERESTROIKA, supra note 44, at 1–3.
221. See J.A. Carty, Changing Models of the International System, in PERESTROIKA,
supra note 44, at 13.
222. See Tunkin, Politics, supra note 106, at 335–38.
223. See S.C. Res. 660, ¶¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990); see also S.C.
Res. 661, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662
(Aug. 9, 1990); S.C. Res. 664, U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (Aug. 18, 1990); S.C. Res. 665, ¶¶
1–4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (Aug. 25, 1990).
224. See Aaron Belkin & James G. Blight, Triangular Mutual Security: Why the Cuban Missile Crisis Matters in a World Beyond the Cold War, 12 POL. PSYCHOL. 727,
728–31 (1991).
225. See Tunkin, Politics, supra note 106, at 337.
226. 28 UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
1024 (15th ed. 2005).
227. Id.
228. See NATO’s Role in Kosovo, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (July 15, 1999),
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm.
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other states, 229 and the eruption of ethnic conflicts in Central Asia, Europe, Africa, and elsewhere, 230 the world suddenly seemed far more
chaotic, bloody, and lawless than ten years prior. With the start of the
Bush presidency, phrases like “new world order,” “American exceptionalism,” “lawless world,” and “collapse of multilateralism” echoed the
broader sentiment that international law was again in crisis.231 Thus, one
of the enduring challenges for post-Cold War international law has been
the inability to develop a working multilateral framework for ensuring
global security.
A second crisis in international law, broadly speaking, was bound up in
the “human rights boom” of the 1990s and 2000s. These debates can be
found in the contestations over the creation of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, and International Criminal Court; 232 the fiery debates over universal jurisdiction; 233 jus cogens norms; 234 and doctrinal wars over the
application of legal categories like “war crimes,” genocide, and “crimes
against humanity” to what we can all agree was mass murder around the
world. 235
Third, over the past twenty years, international law was maturing into a
highly complex patchwork of new separate sub-fields of international
law in practice—from international environmental law, to international
criminal law, to international economic law (itself further fractionalized

229. See Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS,
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_97/1997index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011); see
also Attacks on U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, GLOBAL SEC.,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/98emb.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
230. See Thomas S. Szayna, Potential for Ethnic Conflict in the Caspian Region, in
FAULTLINES OF CONFLICT IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS (Olga Oliker &
Thomas S. Szayna eds., 2003); see also Kikkawa Gen, Preventing Ethnic Conflicts: A
Reconsideration of the Self-Determination Principle, in CONTAINING CONFLICT: CASES IN
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY (Sato Hideo ed., 2003); William W. Allen, Forward to WILLIAM
T. JOHNSEN, PANDORA’S BOX REOPENED: ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS 3 (1994); Kenneth Menkhaus & Louis Ortmayer, Somalia: Misread Crises
and Missed Opportunities, in PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
211 (Bruce W. Jentleson ed., 2000).
231. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD 8–22 (2005).
232. See Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct.
2001, at 150, 151.
233. See id. at 150.
234. See Ulf Linderfalk, The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s
Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 855 (2007).
235. See Karyn Becker, Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing, in 50 ISSUES BOOK:
EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, MODEL U.N. OF THE FAR WEST (2000),
available at http://www.munfw.org/archive/50th/4th1.htm.
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into various subspecialties)—alongside conventional categories like international humanitarian law. 236 The academic discipline of international
law evolved symbiotically with these developments in public and private
international law, 237 even providing the impetus for, and generating, several sub-fields. 238 This process of substantive fragmentation went hand in
hand with institutional fragmentation, theoretical disaggregation, and
growing tolerance for political pluralism. 239 Some have even described
this as a split between American and European approaches to international law, the split itself now amenable to CIL analysis. 240
These three conflicts—unilateralism vs. multilateralism, particularism
vs. universalism in human rights discourse, and fragmentation—are but
three main faultlines, of many. But the main commonality between the
three is the systematic exclusion of a number of global stakeholders, actors, voices, or more simply, communities in the overall international law
agenda. The disconnect between the wishes of acting global elites and
the hordes of anti-war and environmental rights protesters is palpable. 241
The principal anxiety of non-governing elites is that international law is
rapidly mushrooming somewhere in Geneva, New York, Brussels, or the
236. See Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L
REV. 213, 225–26 (2008).
237. John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, Symposium, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535 (1993) (discussing the emergence and new academic importance of subsets of international law, such as international economic law,
international environmental law, restricting weapons and drug trade, and human rights
law).
238. These sub-fields are mainly in the international environmental law arena, where
states and private corporate actors are often loathe to act. “Globally, no central organization is coordinating environmental efforts. The United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP) is the formal institution in the area, but . . . . it lacks any effective power to investigate and has no dispute resolution mechanisms.” Id. at 553 (illustrating the difficulty
of encouraging state and private entities to act with regard to international environmental
problems).
239. See Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 579 (2002); see also U.N. G.A. Rep. of
the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess. May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶¶ 46–222, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti
Koskenniemi).
240. See Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘The Divided West’: International Lawyers in Europe
and America, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 553, 555 (2007) (comparatively reviewing recent scholarship and noting “[t]hat the works of American and European international lawyers
could be so different as to reach or even cross the threshold of comparability is, in itself,
a valuable if somewhat unsettling finding . . . .”).
241. See John D. Haskell, Takings Risks Ethically, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 285, 289–92
(2010).
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Hague, but without their knowledge or participation and in a routine way
that has become almost mechanical. 242 There are no venues for political
contestation, and thus, international law just is; as it is made, so it continues to exist.
Herein lay at least four answers to why contemporary CIL must be situated against the Cold War international law debates. First, at their theoretical core, the Cold War debates were about political participation, redistributive outcomes of trade regimes, and rights to unique forms of
economic development, religious, and cultural pluralism. 243 Decolonization and national liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s were a
direct result of these theoretical debates. Second, and perhaps more importantly, these debates had a concrete procedural/participatory aspect.
Decolonization was not simply about national liberation; it was also
about acquiring a seat at the UN General Assembly, about participating
in the debates, about acquiring possible international law making powers. 244 Similarly, in the interwar period, the participatory debate centered
on the role of the League of Nations as either a nest for imperialist
hawks, 245 or as a venue for the dynamic expansion of the international
community. 246
Of course, the Cold War international law debates were also about traditional spheres of influence, re-colonization, dependency theories, and
new forms of economic and military protectorates for the newly independent states. 247 Empowering decolonized states and giving them a
242. There is a sense of “deepening insinuation of international law into the internal
affairs of sovereign states . . . . [that raises] sharp questions about the status of this emerging body of law.” Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. the American Constitution—
Something’s Got to Give, NAT’L INT., Spring 1999, at 30.
243. See Sam Marullo, Political, Institutional, and Bureaucratic Fuel for the Arms
Race, 7 SOC. F. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 29, 35–48 (Mar. 1992) (examining the true underpinnings to the end of the Cold War through a Sociological lens).
244. See generally EDWARD MCWHINNEY, UNITED NATIONS LAW MAKING: CULTURAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL RELATIVISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING FOR AN ERA OF
TRANSITION 170–77 (1984) (analyzing the Third World’s ‘lawmaking’ powers at the
UN).
245. While collective security was one of the greater goals of the League of Nations, if
not the primary goal, many of those who were “not so disposed towards schemes of cooperative defense” celebrated the League’s failure in this regard. C.G. Fenwick, The
“Failure” of the League of Nations, 30 AM. J. INT’L L. 506, 506 (1936).
246. Although the League of Nations suffered from a “failure of collective security,”
other aspects of the League “concerned with the organization and administration of social
and economic activities, including the International Labor Bureau,” were unaffected. Id.
247. For example, scholars debated whether or not the end of the Cold War would
bring “a return to the shifting alliances and instabilities of the multipolar era that existed
prior to World War II” or a “great power society” where international coordination would
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voice at the UN General Assembly was acceptable so long as it did not
dilute the power of the UN Security Council members. 248 So the call to
return to twentieth century theoretical debates should not be seen as a
return to the actual political or intellectual postures of that time. But
there is something vital and inspiring about how the twentieth century
was pregnant with substantive and structural alternatives to the dominant
post-WWII international legal order.
Third, these debates on procedural aspects had corollary substantive
components. How decisions were made at the UN related directly to the
question of what decisions would be considered, which related directly to
the functions of international law. Who is international law for? What is
the correct balance between free trade and local labor laws? What is the
best way to regulate the movement of capital, goods, and labor? Why do
we need to restrict the power of states or multinational corporations?
These are the questions the Cold War was ostensibly fought over, good
questions to which there are still no satisfactory answers. The past twenty
years also produced new challenges, such as how to define the values of
intergenerational equity and biosphere preservation in nonanthropocentric terms; and the proper balance between the threats posed
by global terrorist networks, traditional doctrines of criminal liability,
and evolving standards of international criminal law.
CIL should seek to address these challenges by reference to different
national, ethnic, religious, and historical approaches to international law
and governance. Unfortunately, doing so is not as simple as opening a
foreign international law textbook and searching for different approaches. 249 While humans share certain uniting traits and universal aspirations,
and different tribes of humans answer the above questions in radically
different ways, where the answers are located is not at all evident. CIL
can unlock where and how we find at least some answers to these questions.

rely on “economic liberalism and political democracy” rather than the threat of force.
James M. Goldgeier & Michael McFaul, A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in
the Post-Cold War Era, 46 INT’L ORG. 467, 467–68 (1992).
248. The Security Council has been criticized as a “hegemony of the industrialized
north,” essentially “the ruling oligarchy of the United Nations,” with only limited decision-making powers granted to the General Assembly. Albert Venter, Reform of the United Nations Security Council: A Comment on the South African Position, 20 INT’L J.
WORLD PEACE 29, 30–31 (2003).
249. See, e.g., Bilahari Kausikan, An Asian Approach to Human Rights, 89 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 146, 146 (1995) (describing the complexity of and comparing different
approaches to human rights in Japan and India).
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Fourth, it is a geo-political fact that China has emerged as a new superpower. 250 It has its own deep history, traditions, languages, and
unique approach to international law. The lessons of Cold War CIL are
directly relevant to our understanding of this new reality. The USSR and
China share remarkable similarities: they are self-proclaimed socialist
states, with unitary political hierarchies and centralized academic organizations (especially at the highest echelons and in fields like international
law). New analysts approaching China’s international law doctrine are
likely to be encumbered by similar misconceptions to those felt by an
earlier generation of Sovietologists—‘background’ notions about a hyper-politicized judiciary or academy (the familiar refrain of ‘telephone
justice’ or ‘telephone doctrine’), rampant, across-the-board abuse of human rights, a covert imperial agenda, and so on. By situating our approaches to Chinese international law against the earlier experience with
Soviet international law, lessons can be teased out that may help to diffuse the alarmist tendencies now gaining steam. 251
Traditional comparative law has much to offer on how to deal with
these four contemporary challenges. Indeed, scholars have already
started down this path. 252 At the centennial summit in New Orleans in
2000, for instance, Mathias Reimann wrote of the need for comparative
law to take on transnational issues, including global and regional trade
organizations, the EU, and similar bodies. 253 In the ensuing ten years, to
be fair, comparativists did not rush to engage with what Reimann called
‘vertical comparisons.’ 254 This likely had less to do with a lack of me250. “After three decades of spectacular growth, China passed Japan in the second
quarter to become the world’s second-largest economy . . . . The milestone . . . is the most
striking evidence yet that China’s ascendance is for real and that the rest of the world will
have to reckon with a new economic superpower.” David Barboza, China Passes Japan
as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at B1.
251. See id.; see also discussion infra Section III.
252. Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 816, 831 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW] (“The diversity
of the Critical Legal Studies network’s constituency and the current collapse of disciplinary boundaries have made it clear that we need to rethink the relationship between comparative and international law—incidentally a view widely shared by scholars outside the
network as well.”) [hereinafter Mattei, Critical Legal Studies].
253. Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law in the International Age, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1103 (2001). For a more recent rendition of Reimann’s claim,
see Reza Dibadj, Panglossian Transnationalism, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 256–59
(2008).
254. These themes were picked up and elaborated in law and society circles in Europe
and elsewhere. See, e.g., Roger Cotterrell, Transnational Communities and the Concept
of Law, 21 RATIO JURIS 1, 3 (2008) (describing the ongoing process of global legal plura-
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thodological tools or familiarity with international law and institutions,
as with a general feeling of inertia. It is safe to say that the discipline of
comparative law in the U.S. during the Bush era was dispirited and disorganized. 255 What purpose was there, for instance, to study the traditional justice systems of Iraq or Afghanistan if the American leaders
openly spoke of imposing democratization and modernization reforms?
Whether as a result of the 2008 presidential election in the U.S., or a
constellation of other reasons, many in the discipline are optimistic
again. The publication in 2009 of the seventh edition of Schlesinger’s
Comparative Law furthers the diversification of the traditional civil/common law divide by introducing a much broader horizontal scope of
inquiry. 256 The new casebook also embraces Reimann’s call for ‘vertical
comparisons,’ though it stops short of mixing international and comparative law for pedagogical reasons. 257 Additionally, one positive result of
the global financial crisis and its aftermath is the more aggressive pursuit
of global harmonization by comparative lawyers. Ralf Michaels recently
wrote of the need for comparative lawyers to take on the World Bank’s
linear and grossly deficient Doing Business project.258 One of America’s
leading comparative lawyers and legal anthropologists, Annelise Riles,
organized a large conference to explore ‘techniques of hope’ in the
broadest sense. 259 And in 2009, the International University College of
Turin led a collaborative project on global legal standards which had, as
lization as the multiplication of international institutions, norms and dispute resolution
processes, but without a “single discursive arena in which legal reasoning takes place”).
255. This statement is based on the self-reflection of the authors, rather than an assessment of others’ work. Furthermore, even in the discipline’s dejected periods, it is not
correct to claim that “it [is] hard to find much well-done comparative-law work.”
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 9, at 351. Though Kennedy credits the Common Core project, of which the authors are a part, he overlooks the dramatic cumulative
growth of smaller-scale substantive comparative law projects, and the exciting growth of
comparative law outside of the US/Europe. These projects expanded from 2000–2008 as
well, so the above periodization (following U.S. presidential election cycles) should only
be seen as facilitating the telling of this story, not literally implying causation.
256. SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 26.
257. Id. at 8–13; see also Reimann, supra note 253, at 1116–17.
258. See Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing
Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
765, 765 (2009).
259. See Conference, Techniques of Hope: How Professionals and Professionalism
Can Stabilize the Markets and Change the World, CORNELL LAW SCH. (Mar. 26, 2009),
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/international/clarke_program/conferences/Hope-asTechnique.cfm; see also Annelise Riles, Is the Law Hopeful? (Cornell Law Sch., Working
Papers
Series,
2010),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=clsops_pap
ers (forthcoming in HOPE IN THE ECONOMY (H. Miyazaki and R. Swedberg eds., 2010)).
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its aim, to suggest alternative models of development inspired by traditions and concerns of the global political, geographic, and economic “periphery.” 260
International law is also converging on this path. Led by David Kennedy and his newstream, critical international law theorists are again asking
the difficult questions: why do law and development projects go south
(geographically, metaphorically, pejoratively)?; what is the role of global
elites in turning a blind eye to the world’s dispossessed states and
peoples?; what can international lawyers do to break the familiar intellectual cycles of crisis/progress, center/periphery, ‘us’ vs. ‘them?’ 261 In a
related stream of inquiry, a group of international lawyers calling itself
TWAIL, led by Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, also seeks to revive a
number of long-ignored interests, not just from the Global South, but
also the interests of repressed indigenous groups in the Global North. 262
TWAIL is concerned principally with questions of imperialism, neoimperialism, and modern continuities of longstanding patterns of exploitation. 263 Bridging these two groups is an emerging third stream, roughly
called national traditions in international law, which seeks to explore particular national or pre-national traditions or outlooks on international
law. The next Section surveys these efforts in the context of the emerging field of CIL and asks what lessons CIL can draw from these diverse,
yet interrelated, streams.

260. INT’L UNIV. COLLEGE OF TURIN GLOBAL LEGAL STANDARDS RESEARCH GROUP,
IUC INDEPENDENT POLICY REPORT: AT THE END OF THE END OF HISTORY—GLOBAL
LEGAL STANDARDS: PART OF THE SOLUTION OR PART OF THE PROBLEM (Global Jurist vol.
9 2009) (collectively written by IUC Global Legal Standards Research Group including
this Article’s authors).
261. Newstream, also known as NAIL (“new approaches to international law”) is a
broad term used to describe non-traditional approaches to international law, especially as
pertains to the history of the development of international law and its institutions. See
David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1
(1989) [hereinafter Kennedy, New Stream]; see also Deborah Z. Cass, Navigating the
Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 341,
342–45 (1996).
262. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–12 (2005) [hereinafter ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM]; see also
BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003) (critiquing from a historical and
interdisciplinary approach, international law from the perspective of Third World movements).
263. See ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, supra note 262, at 6–12.

2011]

COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW

427

II. PITFALLS: WHAT CAN COMPARATIVE LAW & INTERNATIONAL LAW
LEARN FROM EACH OTHER?
A. Mapping the Field
At this point, it is necessary to take a step back and define several
broad terms and categories used above and in the remainder of the Article. There is no longer any question that different nations conceptualize
and interpret international norms differently. As referenced above, the
existence of national yearbooks of international law, national associations of international law, and national international law journals, may
evidence, at the very least, a desire to stake out a ‘national doctrinal identity’ or offer a space for the publication of scholarship arising from the
territorial boundaries of a given state that may not ‘rise’ to the standards
of ‘elite’ international law publications. 264 National yearbooks also serve
the functional purpose of documenting a given state’s treaty practice,
national case law concerning international law questions, and related
notes. 265 Furthermore, many national international law yearbooks and
journals also publish in the local language, which provides an important
outlet outside the English-language dominated ‘elite’ international law
journals. 266
At its most basic level, CIL simply entails the textual comparison of
different doctrinal positions on a given international law topic. As an
example, to get a good idea of how scholars in Canada and scholars in
Russia interpret maritime obligations and boundaries in the Arctic, it is
fair to turn to the Canadian and Russian yearbooks/journals of international law, respectively. Presumably, the texts need to be translated into a
common language before an individual can compare the similarities and
differences of the scholars’ positions. Of course, this form of analysis is
identical to the age-old process of treaty interpretation or discourse analysis and represents the very essence of what legal attachés do on a daily
basis. Thus, though this is clearly a comparison between different nations’ laws, such work falls within the discipline of international law as
opposed to CIL. Similarly, the process of ascertaining general principles
of international law, though also CIL in the strict sense, does not fall
within a new conception of CIL.
Rather, this Article is concerned with the abuse of, and suspicious of
the ambiguity in, terms such as ‘Anglo-American tradition of interna264. See infra text accompanying notes 338–42; see also Mattei, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 252, at 833.
265. Jan Stepan & Frank C. Chapman, National and Regional Yearbooks of International Law and Relations: A Brief Survey, 8 INT’L J.L. LIBR. 19, 19 (1980).
266. Id. at 20.
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tional law,’ Nigerian approaches to international law, Third World approaches to international law, Indian approaches, etc., as well as terms
used in the brief historical overview above, such as “general international
law,” the West, “socialist international law,” “Soviet international law,”
etc.
1. Why (and is it Possible to) Study Different Traditions in International
Law?
At first blush, national approaches or ‘national traditions’ in international law appears to be a tautological misnomer. If it is international
law, it is meant to be law between nations, and presumably the nation at
issue is a constituent part of that law. For this reason, international law
scholars have constantly sought to clarify the term or to discard it altogether, with suggestions like “transnational law,” 267 “global” or “world”
law, 268 or “global governance.” 269 Insofar as the term is fixed in the
field’s popular and professional imaginations, it simply must be dealt
with. However, there has never been a clearly defined sense of what it
means to have a national approach to international law.
For instance, it has always been exceedingly difficult to say whether
America has a national tradition in international law. To illustrate, who
in the American legal academy could summarize the main tenets of the
American approach to international law? Even assuming such a brave
step were taken, for every such enunciation by, say, Anne-Marie Slaughter or W. Michael Reisman, one could point to a countervailing summation by, say, Jack Goldsmith or David Kennedy. 270 The point is, within
the American society of international law scholars, there are a sufficient
267. See, e.g., PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
268. See, e.g., Pierrick Le Goff, Global Law: A Legal Phenomenon Emerging from the
Process of Globalization, 14 INT’L J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119 (2007) (exploring the
notion of global law, its creation, and its role as a field of study); Lawrence S. Finkelstein, What is Global Governance, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 367 (1995).
269. For an overview of this progression and a modern restatement of the global law
thesis, see, e.g., RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW 53–117 (2010).
270. Compare Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183 (suggesting that a network of interconnected but distinctly national departments do and should define current international law rather than international
legal norms that override national legal precedent); W. Michael Reisman, Old Wine in
New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Contemporary International Law
and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 171 (1988) (opining that international norms of nonintervention are preferable to unilateral actions by powerful nations); Jack Goldsmith,
Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L.
327 (2000) (concluding that international human rights law should not preempt domestic
law); Kennedy, New Stream, supra note 261 (describing international institutions and
international law as doctrinal rather than sources of normative laws and rights).
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number of diametrically opposed positions that it becomes impossible to
brand one position dominant or orthodox. 271 Even in moments of relative
accord within any given academic circle in either international law or
comparative law, basic concepts can remain indeterminate or ambiguous,
or can be usurped. For example, the adoption of the term “Bush doctrine”
to refer to the right to use force preemptively when faced with a threat or
risk of threat, 272 was disparaged by those inside the last administration
because the term quickly grew to signify anything from ‘the war on terror,’ to waterboarding, to good-old imperialism. 273
Furthermore, doctrinal positions are dynamic and change rather quickly. They seem to routinely adapt to new political needs, economic challenges, and personal preferences or animosities. Thus, assuming it was
possible to chart out the doctrinal positions of the twenty leading American international lawyers at time A, several weeks or months later, the
matrix will not hold.
In response to the temptation to observe national legal systems as
wholes, or what Riles calls “legal corporeology,” 274 comparative lawyers
learned a long time ago that they need to narrow the scope of their
study. 275 Yet even with narrowed approaches, issues of terminology,
translation, and expertise will continue to trouble the field.276 As explained above, the first generation of CIL scholars (Korovin, Hazard,
Butler) intuitively sought to limit the scope of their respective inquiries,

271. Compare Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 4 (1990), with Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law—20 Years Later,
20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 7 (2009) (examining the changing role of politics in international
law). For a similar point, see R. A. Mullerson, Sources of International Law: New Tendencies in Soviet Thinking, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 494, 494 (1989) (“During a joint SovietBritish seminar on international law in the spring of 1988, [incidentally, organized by
W.E. Butler], Professor Ian Brownlie said that it is not possible to speak of a British doctrine of international law because there are too many different points of view, even different schools.”); cf. C. J. Warbrick, The Theory of International Law: Is There an English Contribution?, in PERESTROIKA, supra note 44, at 41 (suggesting the existence of a
unique English contribution to international law).
272. Joel R. Paul, The Bush Doctrine: Making or Breaking Customary International
Law, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 457 (2004).
273. Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, The ‘Bush Doctrine’: Can Preventive War Be
Justified?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 843 (2009) (discussing the continuing disputes
over the normative, strategic, and legal wisdom of what has been called the “Bush Doctrine”).
274. Riles, Encountering Amateurism, supra note 27, at 118.
275. Id. (discussing the need to avoid panaromic views of legal systems).
276. See, e.g., Hungdah Chiu, The Development of Chinese International Law Terms
and the Problem of Their Translation into English, 27 J. ASIAN STUD. 485, 485–86
(1968).
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but even so, the problem of legal corporeology was a persistent hurdle.
Unless one attacked the global legal web from a rigorously Marxist materialist framework—at which point CIL is useless except to show shades
of gradation, or how inequitable one state’s view of the global order is
versus another’s—socialist and Western legal families were sufficiently
variegated such that discussion of Soviet or ‘bourgeois’ international law
had to be heavily qualified or contextualized in an effort to avoid devolving to overbroad clichés of either one or the other. 277
Several examples help highlight the contingent nature of statehood and
other international political identities, such as regional groups, and identity-based groups or movements.
a. The Myths of Regional Laws & Asian Approaches
As mentioned above, over the past decades, scholars associated with
the TWAIL movement have begun reviving the idea of regional approaches to international law and global governance. B.S. Chimni has
gone so far as to claim that “the Asian approach to international law has
in its core been articulated by TWAIL.” 278 The idea of a collective
‘Asian’ approach to public international law or human rights,279 and distinct Asian-state approaches to international law was first popularized
during the formal decolonization period of the 1960s and 1970s. 280 Contemporary international law scholarship on the Asian-values debate can
be historical (as in studies on ancient Indian conceptions of international
law), 281 or it may focus on religious commonalities between people in
Asia (such as Frederick Tse-shyang Chen’s writings on the Confucian
approach to world order and international law). 282 More recently, the discussion on shared aspirations and common cultural values has been
grounded in quasi-anthropological assertions about a deep Asian spiri-

277. See MIÉVILLE, supra note 214, at 60 (“quickly . . . dispens[ing] with … the ‘official’ theories of international law of the erstwhile Soviet Bloc”).
278. B.S. Chimni, Is There an Asian Approach to International Law, 14 ASIAN Y.B.
INT’L L. 249, 264 (2008) (emphasis added).
279. See, e.g., Kausikan, supra note 249, at 146.
280. See, e.g., K.R.R. Sastry, Hinduism and International Law, 117 RECUEIL DES
COURS 503 (1966) (assessing the principles of international law from a Hindu perspective).
281. Ved P. Nanda, International Law in Ancient Hindu India, in RELIGION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 51–57 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999) [hereinafter
RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW].
282. Frederick Tse-shyang Chen, The Confucian View of World Order, in RELIGION
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 281, at 27.
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tualism, historical practice of non-violence, and inner respect for the environment. 283
These essentialized conceptions of ‘Asia’ or particular Asian nations
are problematic for several reasons. The most obvious is geographic. 284
India offers the best example in this respect. The product of colonialism,
India is a veritable jigsaw puzzle of mixed ethnicities, language groups,
religious groups and class factions. As a political body, it is an amalgamation of former principalities, carved into sometimes arbitrary federal
units, 285 with a number of unresolved border disputes with China 286 and
Pakistan. 287 Nonetheless, it is tempting to view it as a unitary state with
an easily identifiable ‘Third World’ voice. But the notion of an Indian
approach to international law, bracketed within a Third World approach,
is not dissimilar from the way the Indian ‘brand’ is attached to a single
style of music, dance, and cuisine in the West. These national brands,
whether food or approaches to international law, are meaningless; just as
south Indian cuisine is different from Guajarati cuisine, so too, is it difficult to categorize a single Indian approach to international law.
Although prefatory remarks in “national approaches” literature often
acknowledge the vast cultural and intellectual pluralism within a country
[or region], the exclusion of these sub-national, sub-regional, or separat283. See generally RODA MUSHKAT, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ASIAN
VALUES: LEGAL NORMS AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES (2004) (examining the extent to
which Asian cultural relativism influences interpretation of the norms of international
environmental law and the application of these norms in the region).
284. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Where Is Asia? When Is Asia? Theorizing Comparative
Law and International Law, 44 UC DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). For similar analysis in the European context, see Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Reflections on the Necessity of Regional Approaches to International Law Through the Prism of the European Example:
Neither Yes nor No, Neither Black nor White, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 7–9 (2010).
285. Consider the case of Bengal, which was partitioned from the former British colony of India in 1905 pursuant to Lord Curzon’s order. The partition was annulled in 1911.
Bengal was again partitioned in 1947 following India’s independence into two provinces,
the predominantly Hindu West Bengal, and the predominantly Muslim East Bengal.
From 1947 until 1971, East Bengal was a province of Pakistan pursuant to the Mountbatten Plan and the India Independence Act of 1947. In 1971, East Bengal became Bangladesh following the Bangladesh Liberation War. See Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010)
(analyzing the historical strife that accompanies the demarcation of borders to create new
sovereign nations); see also 14 BANGLADESH, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 718–
19 (15th ed. 2005).
286. See, e.g., Factbox—India, China Begin Talks on Border Dispute, REUTERS (Aug.
7, 2009, 4:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/07/idUSDEL465372.
287. See Arundhati Roy, Kashmir’s Fruits of Discord, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/opinion/09roy.html?ref=kashmir.
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ist voices from a supposedly empirical study has a dangerous consequence: it validates one particular view as dominant to the exclusion of
the other. 288 The same problem inheres when we imagine ‘Chinese approaches to international law,’ except it is compounded by an alreadystrong instinct to presuppose internal coherence and crystalline consistency in international law doctrine that emanates from the mainland. 289
Just as the misplaced confidence in the ‘official’ Soviet position drowned
out legitimate alternative positions, so in the context of China, the notion
of a ‘Chinese approach to international law’ presupposes centrality of
control over the means of intellectual production and doctrinal uniformity. 290 In other words, by indulging in the fantasy of a singular Chinese
take on international law, the voices of opposition movements within the
mainstream or heterodox positions slightly off the beaten track are silenced, paradoxically reinforcing the dominance of the presumed majority opinion.
b. The Study of ‘Other’ Traditions in International Law & Comparative
Law
Critical streams in comparative and international law are, of course,
aware of the exclusion of the Derridean ‘other’ within mainstream narratives. 291 Sometimes, the exclusion is the function of good faith ignor-

288. Cf. Fabri, supra note 284, at 10. Fabri discusses the geographical and political
inclusion/exclusion bias inherent in the formulation of a ‘European’ approach to international law, but nonetheless suggests the possibility of an ambivalent dualistic European
approach:
However, a European approach necessarily competes with a plurality of rather
diverse national approaches and it therefore presupposes the possibility of discovering enough unity despite the diversity, or within the diversity, and progressing towards more unity. This is the internal aspect. But there also is an external aspect, and if we acknowledge the idea of a European approach, we must
also acknowledge that the external aspect carries a certain number of specificities. In other words, a European approach is both what unifies and specifies, a
duality which can easily lead to ambivalence.
Id.
289. See, e.g., Jacques de Lisle, China’s Approach to International Law: A Historical
Perspective, 94 AM SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 267, 268–71 (2000) (discussing the evolution
of China’s approach to international law).
290. Id. at 275.
291. See the excellent collection of essays in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS
(Anne Orford ed., 2006) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS]. For a good
introduction to legal deconstruction, more generally, see J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive
Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 748–49 (1987).
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ance. 292 Scholars simply have not thought to ask (or do not have time to
ask) what Moldavian jurists think of the Transdnestrian conflict, or what
Somali jurists think of the concept of universal jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court in the context of piracy. However, many times
the exclusion is purposeful, a way to shield plunder, guilt, and legal liability. 293
Over the past ten years, figures associated with various critical streams
in international and comparative law have started to expose longstanding
regional legal groupings as utterly contingent and artificial.294 The trailblazing work in this respect is Jorge Esquirol’s project to uncover the
‘myth of Latin American law.’ 295 In a series of influential articles, Esquirol analyzes the work of Rene David to expose the contingency of regional constructs and their appropriation by powerful agents. 296 More
trenchant attacks on the (f)utility of regional or identity-based interpretations of international law can be seen in the Asian values debate, which
expose both the contingency of political and/or regional constructs and
also raise the dual questions of identity and authority/authenticity. 297
Identity concerns the question of who is legitimately entitled to speak on
behalf of a group or nation. 298 Authority/authenticity, on the other hand,
refers to the degree of legitimacy/credibility attached to a given “voice”
by its audience. 299
292. See Antony Anghie, On Critique and the Other, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS
OTHERS, supra note 291, at 389.
293. See, e.g., UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, P LUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS
ILLEGAL (2008) (exploring a number of global examples when the law is utilized to impose injustice).
294. See, e.g., Ruskola, supra note 284.
295. See Jorge Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV.
41, 42 (2003). For discussion of how Esquirol’s work helps to deconstruct broader regional and national narratives, see David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 9, at 416 n.106.
296. See Esquirol, supra note 295, at 42.
297. Ruskola, supra note 284, at 3.
298. See Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, Legal Pluralism, Indigenous Law and the Special
Jurisdiction in the Andean Countries, in INFORMAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL P LURALISM IN THE
GLOBAL SOUTH 32 (ILSA Beyond Law No. 27, 2004), available at
http://ilsa.org.co:81/node/356 (examining the reforms in many Latin American countries
to account for indigenous peoples).
299. Authenticity can be established or lost on strength of expertise, such as command
of terminology, language and translation skills, and substantive background knowledge of
a culture, ethnic group, or nation. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 276, at 485–86. On textual
authenticity versus authority, see DOMINICK LACAPRA, RETHINKING INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY: TEXTS, CONTEXTS, LANGUAGE 53–60 (1983). Authenticity—as it pertains to the
authentic/‘official’/‘mainstream’/dominant interpretations of contemporary international
law—is directly relevant in both of the above meanings. See id. at 254 (discussing ‘au-
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An instructive illustration of the interwoven issues of identity and authenticity can be in the persona of even the most mainstream international law scholars, such as Rosalyn Higgins, the former President of the International Court of Justice from 2006 to 2009. 300 For instance, discussing the issue of whether it is any more difficult for her to be critical in the
Israel case concerning the construction of the wall in the Palestinian territory 301 because she is Jewish, Higgins flatly responded that she did not
think so, stressing that she judged the case as an international lawyer and
not with regard to her background. She explains, “I also think that the
fact you happen to be Jewish doesn’t mean you think that everything the
State of Israel does is right.” 302 Yet when the UK Foreign Office put her
name forward for election to the court, it should be remembered, there
were fears that some countries in the UN would not vote for a Jewish
woman. While Judge Higgins dismisses such concerns, saying “I don’t
think I have ever been perceived as Rosalyn Higgins, the Jewish international lawyer—and I hope not Rosalyn Higgins, the woman international
lawyer,” 303 how credible is this act of detachment in the eyes of her audience? Conversely, if she had claimed to speak as a feminist ‘voice’ on
international law, to what extent would this act pass muster? The takeaway from this example—along with the myths of Latin American law, or
Asian approaches to international law—is to beware of putative oracles
speaking on behalf of a given international law tradition; to beware of
thentic’ Marxist tradition). The authors expand on LaCapra’s dichotomy and use authenticity in its everyday sense (fake vs. authentic) as well as the broader sense of ‘identity,
propriety and authenticity’ which is established by reference to a pure opposite ‘other,’ in
this case imperialist, Chinese, feminist, Third World, or indigenous orders. With respect
to the former, authenticity is important for very practical reasons. In writing a comparative legal history, a comparativist is not dealing with ‘international law’ but rather what is
left of international law—the writings of jurists, old codes, constitutions, and textbooks.
See Pierre Legrand, “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte:” Intimations of Jacques Derrida as
Comparatist-at-Law, in DERRIDA AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 125 (Peter Goodrich, Florian
Hoffman, Michel Rosenfeld, & Cornelia Vismann eds., 2008); Lorca, supra note 18, at
479 n.6 (quoting Arnold McNair, Aspects of State Sovereignty, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 6,
6 n.1 (1949) (noting that “most history of international law is either a history of its literature, or a history of international relations . . . . [and] [i]t is difficult to find much history
of the content, that is, the actual rules of law as applied in practice”)).
300. The Court: President Rosalyn Higgins, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=6 (last visited Feb. 16, 2011).
301. For the advisory opinion in the case, see Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July
9).
302. Joshua Rosenberg, British Woman is World’s Most Senior Judge, THE TELEGRAPH
(April 6, 2006), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1514961/British-woman-isworlds-most-senior-judge.html.
303. Id.
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one’s own doctrinal views being mischaracterized as falling into a rival
international law tradition; and lastly, to understand that group-based
international legal theory taxonomies (including in some ways the
present one) are by and large useless to the individuals who actually
drive policy, manage exports and imports, or re-negotiate sovereign debt.
Of course, these issues of identity and authority/authenticity are not
new to comparative law. One of the great achievements of comparative
law is that it has finally developed operational methodologies and techniques to identify these issues and address them. 304 Both are useful to
break down what could be called “methodological path-dependence”—
the idea of the nation-state as the default and most-useful category for
thinking about transnational social phenomena, 305 including the discipline of international law. 306 And as shown above, identity and authenticity critiques also allow the demystification of the notion that given groups
of scholars represent a particular minority, 307 or other marginal voices.308
Thus far, the critiques of regional or identity-based approaches to international law suggest that the normative challenge for CIL scholars
who want to do something with CIL aside from just classification is not
to create an alternative perspective on international law, but rather to
recognize a plurality of existing perspectives. Second, if the national pluralism thesis is accepted, then the task of CIL becomes to articulate these
304. See, e.g., Mitchel de S.-O.-L’E. Lasser, The Question of Understanding, in
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 9, at 197, 205, 237. Lasser’s contributions,
particularly with respect to the ‘official’/unofficial divide are extremely relevant to the
deconstruction of complex texts (i.e., a 2008 Iranian international law treatise written by
a figure with unclear ties to the ruling regime) and conflicting or compound identitybased arguments.
305. Cotterrell calls it “methodological nationalism” but this terminology may be misleading. See Cotterrell, supra note 254, at 4.
306. Id. at 4–5.
307. In this respect, see INTLAWGRRLS, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010), a blog co-authored by a number of influential female international law
scholars, subtitled “voices on international law, policy and practice” and further subtitled
“it’s our world, after all.” Id. The purpose of the blog seems to facilitate discussion and
the dissemination of ideas. Diane Marie A Mann, IntLawGrrls’ Heartfelt Hello,
(Feb.
10,
2007,
9:23
PM),
INTLAWGRRLS
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2007/02/intlawgirls-heartfelt-hello.html (“Women now
have a hand in our world’s affairs: think Albright and Arbour, del Ponte and Higgins,
Ginsburg and Rice. Yet our voices remain faint, in backrooms and in the blogosphere.
IntLawGrrls—women who teach and work in international law, policy and practice—
hope to change all that. We embrace foremothers’ names to encourage crisp commentary,
delivered at times with a dash of sass.”). To what extent blogs such as this purposefully
include or exclude certain other groups, or can be said to represent an identity-based
ideological or political agenda, is altogether unclear.
308. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS, supra note 291.
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myriad national perspectives on international law. But here a problem
presents itself. The deconstruction of the nation state as a coherent intellectual model logically facilitates the further deconstruction and pluralization of the nation-state’s constituent communities, whether they are
ethnic, geographic, or class-based. 309 But, if all of these categories, too,
are contingent and potentially unstable, then all that is left are the writings of particular jurists, or at most, networks of scholars working in
common intellectual affinity with one another. Should the task of CIL be
limited to studying the differences between these theoretical schools, or
confederations of scholars? The answer, perhaps, is yes, but with important methodological nuances.
2. CIL as the Study of Norm Diffusion?
With the difficulty of identifying the subject of study (states, national
groups, etc.), perhaps it is better for CIL to focus on the object (the actual
norms in question), focusing its inquiry on the processes of norm diffusion across jurisdictions. 310 First, is it possible to study the process of
transplantation of entire “theories” or models of international law from
one state to another? This question is closely related to the question of
the appropriate scope of CIL inquiry that was addressed above. 311
Second, is there still value to be gained from studying broad patterns of
norm diffusion, transplants, and receptions? In brief, the answer to both
questions is yes. There is great value to understanding how legal transplants transcend geographical, linguistic, and political boundaries and
penetrate seemingly foreign terrains. 312 This can be done by analyzing
the transmission agents, whether legal education reforms, direct imposition (like World Bank structural adjustment policies), or internalized per-

309. Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1457 (1992).
310. See generally LARRY CATA BACKER, HARMONIZATION LAW IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION (2007) (highlighting interactions between different systems and illustrating the way different relationships produce different effects across the world); DAVID B.
GOLDMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION: RECURRING PATTERNS
OF LAW AND Authority 12–34 (2007); William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global
Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 5–7 (2004); Michael Likosky,
Cultural Imperialism in the Context of Transnational Commercial Collaboration, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 221, 222–26 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
311. See supra text accompanying notes 174–82.
312. See Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 252, at 441, 442–43.
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ceptions of “lack” (of a robust legal system) by the local legal elites in a
given state. 313
However, moving from the local to the global, from micro- to macrolevel comparisons is seemingly counterintuitive. At the very least, it goes
against the grain of developments in comparative law over the past two
decades that have moved into more sophisticated models of micro-level
transplants and techniques of monitoring localized reception. 314 On the
other hand, there is no theoretical hurdle to comparing such macro concepts as “international legal theory” or “approaches to governance.” It is
theoretically possible to do functional micro-comparison 315 of a macroconcept like “public international law.” 316 So long as there is no pretense
about capturing universal truths, 317 macro-comparisons of social phenomena like the appropriation of foreign theoretical constructs may actually
be useful. In fact, recent CIL scholarship—such as Arnulf Becker Lorca’s comparative study of the notion of universality in European and peripheral international law—explicitly rests on a functionalist method. 318
The transplantation of vague notions like “international law” or “rule
of law” is also important because they often act as theoretical lodestars
towards which subsequent micro-level reforms are geared.319 Thus, in the
313. See Laura Nader, Law and the Theory of Lack, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 191, 193 (2005).
314. Often, this has been practiced by scholars employing law and economics analysis
in a transnational setting. See, e.g., Mathias M. Siems, Legal Originality, 28 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 147 (2008) (identifying original approaches to legal research); see also
Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, 52
MCGILL L.J. 55, 78–81 (2007); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of
Corporate Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 945 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (using econometrics to study particular events); William B.
Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote Democratic Policy:
The Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 703 (2005).
315. Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 252, at 339, 341; see also ZWEIGERT &
KÖTZ, supra note 206, at 4–5 (discussing micro versus macro comparisons).
316. Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES,
supra note 9, at 110 (arguing that subjects as large as ‘law’ or ‘religion’ can be investigated in functional terms).
317. Id. at 112.
318. Lorca, supra note 18, at 483 (“Section three explores the diversity of legal regimes in the three aforementioned ideal types and argues that the functional equivalences
between them explain a common pattern of appropriation in the semi-periphery.”) (emphasis added).
319. Far from being an academic exercise, studying the diffusion of vague notions
carries significant foreign policy overtones. Consider Attorney General Eric Holder’s
recent claim that “the rule of law is one of the United States’ greatest exports.” Written
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context of traditional legal transplant studies, CIL projects can facilitate a
keener understanding of vertically-imposed reasons for particular domestic reforms. 320 Where nations feel compelled to reform domestic legal
orders to bring them into line with global legal standards, CIL can shed
light on the process of norm diffusion in these contexts.
As with CIL projects focusing on national approaches or identity-based
approaches, CIL projects analyzing norm diffusion also run the risk of
amateurism and corporeology. Additionally, both types of CIL projects
can be attacked on the basis of false objectivity, the notion that the CIL
project itself is not merely an intellectual quest for knowledge or understanding, but carries a particular political agenda.321 Even if scholars are
careful to assume the political dimension of their comparative project
and bring the assumption to the fore, 322 essentially offering a disclaimer
of their political/ideological commitments, there is always an implicit
undisclosed cultural and ideological bias that comes with the comparativist. 323 Likewise, the idea that CIL can offer some sort of noncontextualized truth, or a method of perceiving truth about competing
approaches to international law, vastly misconstrues the capacity and
function of the comparative endeavor.
B. Methodological Minima for CIL
Having answered the core methodological question—whether it is valuable to speak of CIL as a disciplinary bridge between comparative meTestimony by Eric Holder, Attorney General, to U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/testimony/2009/agtestimony-0911181.html.
320. See, e.g., Mamlyuk, Legal Harmonization, supra note 88 (describing how the
post-Soviet transformation to monism in Russian international legal theory necessitated
vertical and horizontal legal harmonization reforms in the IP sector).
321. See George Winterton, Comparative Law Teaching, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 69, 80–81
(1975).
322. See David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES, supra note 9, at 345. “[C]omparatists are sensitive to ‘accusations’ that their
work might have anything one could regard as a politics. To my ears, their sensitivity on
this point can seem so extreme that it is hard to think of it as fully ingenuous.” Id. at 349.
Kennedy goes on to probe the ideological heart of comparative law by deconstructing the
discipline’s history. For an earlier position on comparative law and hegemony, see Ugo
Mattei, Some Realism About Comparativism: Comparative Law Teaching in the Hegemonic Jurisdiction, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 87 (2002). For an example of the selfcongratulation and claim of objectivity at issue, see ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 206,
at 3 (“[B]y the international exchanges which it requires, comparative law procures the
gradual approximation of viewpoints, the abandonment of deadly complacency, and the
relaxation of fixed dogma.”).
323. See Winterton, supra note 321, at 81.

2011]

COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW

439

thod and international law—this Article proceeds with an outline of what
can be called methodological minima and maxima. As a heuristic, the
table below offers one way to conceptualize the functional unit (or range)
perhaps most appropriate for CIL analysis.

Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram of Comparative International Law?
State B

State A
Positive Law
‘Hard’ IL Institutions (i.e.,
Foreign Ministry; Office of
Legal Advisor)
‘Soft’ Secondary Law:
Court Cases,
Treatises,
Processes
‘Soft’ IL Institutions

Strict IL or CL

CL: Functionalism?

Comparative Int’l Law?

Positive Law
‘Hard’ IL Institutions (i.e.,
Foreign Ministry; Office of
Legal Advisor)
‘Soft’ Secondary Law:
Court Cases,
Treatises,
Processes
‘Soft’ IL Institutions

Doctrinal
‘Schools’

Textual Comparison

Doctrinal
‘Schools’

Indiv.Scholar
(National of
Subject A)

Discourse Analysis

Indiv.Scholar
(National of
Subject B)

The idea here is that existing methods already inhabit the wide range of
what would ordinarily fall into the sweeping category of CIL, were such
a discipline to take hold. With respect to positive law, comparative law
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and public/private international law probably already provides the techniques necessary to account for differences across jurisdictions. At this
upper extreme, there is also a conceptual limit to CIL study, which is the
notion of regional approaches, such as European approaches to international law, Asian approaches to international law, or North American
approaches to international law.
The lower limit in CIL inquiry is an individual’s writings on international law and particular schools of international law. If the work of two
or more scholars shares sufficient similarity, it becomes possible to
group it within a larger ‘project’ or ‘tradition,’ and so forth. For this reason, monikers like the Vienna Circle, Frankfurt School, New Haven approach, Trento/Torino Common Core, Harvard CLS, or the Toronto
Group, have a more or less reliable, or at least familiar, referent. Scholars
who become affiliated with these and similar projects share a professional network, may share general political sensibilities, and at the very least,
meet with one another and cite each other’s work. 324
But between these two extremes lies a gulf of contested territory. Moving from the top down, the next possible field is CIL as the study of similarities and difference between two (or more) national approaches to international law and institutions. But even the most basic and familiar categories in international law—the nation-states—blur at close range. 325
Adding the temporal dimension, the dynamic evolution of norms and
doctrinal positions across a relatively short time span, shows that attempts to capture group narratives are but a single frame in a moving
picture of interpretations (the views of several leading jurists), with the
plot changing mid-frame to reflect political or substantive priorities. 326
Moreover, as discussed above, there is nothing inherently different about
comparing how two given foreign ministries react to the introduction of a
new international norm from the traditional functionalist method used in
drawing comparisons about domestic legal orders.327
The next possible candidate for CIL study is a comparison of domestic
processes and structures of making decisions about international law and
international relations. This can be done by reference to cases, treatises,
and other materials that explain how a given policy position is developed. In a way, this form of CIL amounts to a variant of McDougal’s
324. Mattei, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 252, at 829.
325. Continuing with David Kennedy’s metaphor. See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 1997
UTAH L. REV. 545, 550–54 (1997) (discussing the international lawyer’s perspective and
view on subject through metaphor of Aunt Betty, Uncle Chuck, and their photographer).
326. See id.
327. See supra Section II.A.
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processual jurisprudence, an attempt to capture how decisions are made
within the respective country’s foreign policy apparatus. 328 This form of
CIL presupposes, however, that a systemic account of these myriad aspects of social reality is possible; or, alternatively, that scholars could
agree on the proper methodological basis for such an empirical study. If
McDougal’s “disciplined and contextual” policy analysis 329 ultimately
failed to offer a predictive capacity for understanding one state’s actions
under international law, it is hardly an appropriate analytical or descriptive methodology for comparison among multiple actors.330
This leads to the space between the opinions of individual international
law scholars and international law processes, or the domain of doctrinal
schools and ‘soft’ international law institutions. 331 In the Authors’ view,
this is the most proper domain for CIL inquiry for at least three reasons.
First, this is the proper domain by basis of exclusion: traditional public
international law and comparative law already occupy the discursive
space for discussing similarities and differences in positive law across
jurisdictions. Traditional discourse analysis already exists to analyze the
similarities and divergences between individual doctrinal positions. 332
However, there is little work on comparison of institutional projects in
international law—or the comparison of the coordinated output of legal
research institutes, legal centers, and funded research projects.333
To make the abstract more concrete, a perfect example of an institutional project currently afoot that is in dire need of the type of CIL analy328. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power & Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 157 (1953).
329. Myres S. McDougal, Perspective for an International Law of Human Dignity, 53
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 107, 109–10 (1959).
330. Harold Koh’s New Legal Process School is the contemporary intellectual incarnation of this policy analysis jurisprudence. New Legal Process is distinguished from the
earlier school principally by its narrower scope of inquiry. See Mary Ellen O’Connell,
New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 335 (1999).
331. The term “‘soft’ international law institutions” is used here to refer generally to
legal actors, which encompasses networks of scholars, law school research centers, legal
think tanks, but also what is conventionally thought of as actual legal actors in the international arena, such as diplomats.
332. Cf. John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 657 (2008) (theorizing and employing
discourse analysis as a methodology for analyzing legal transplants as “conversations”
between different states’ regulatory regimes).
333. See, e.g., Fabri, supra note 284, at 3 (“[T]he question of the necessity for a European approach to international law is political in the sense that it is necessarily connected
to a project. Giving an answer thus equates to siding with or against the project, more or
less consciously and with more or less nuances. However, I do not believe this should be
voiced within this article.”) (emphasis added).
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sis envisioned here is the work of the Asian Society of International Law,
and its most recent project, the Asian Journal of International Law
(“Asian Journal”). 334 More specifically, what is the historical significance of the publication of the first issue of the new publication in January
2011? Perhaps it exemplifies the assertion of Asia overcoming the West
in economic and even intellectual terms? Is there a commonality of political outlooks among the editors? Does this move signify a new theoretical posture or the emergence of a new network, coalition, or cluster of
scholars with a shared scholarly agenda? Why is the journal being published by Cambridge University Press, and why is it limited to English
language contributions, as a practical convenience—“rather than political
endorsement”—as the editors assert, or perhaps to ensure the highest levels of scholarship through the ‘double-blind peer-review’ process? 335
Presumably, a legal journal is founded to fill a theoretical or structural
void left by pre-existing publication fora, to publish work not being accepted elsewhere, that may be too controversial or non-topical, of a higher or lesser caliber than that published elsewhere, or as a challenge to
existing frameworks. In remembering the Soviet interwar experience, it
should be recalled that Pashukanis founded the Communist Academy
and the legal journal Revolution in Law (Revoliutsiia Prava) as a direct
challenge to not only the heir of the Imperial-era Russian Academy of
Sciences (which became the Soviet Institute of State and Law) but also
as a way to undermine the work of Korovin’s Journal of Soviet Law (Sovetskoe Pravo). This was not only a political posture; it was as much an
expression of theoretical opposition as of institutional rivalry for political
favor and research funding. Similarly, Hazard’s choice of Columbia
University was not merely a personal convenience, it represented an institutional choice with significant consequences—the opportunity to establish a Russian legal studies center 336 and to attract research funding
from individuals and institutions in an intensely charged political climate. 337 Similarly, it is possible that Butler’s choice of London for the

334. See
1
ASIAN
J.
INT’L
L.
1
(2011),
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=AJL (last visited Jan. 16, 2011)
[hereinafter ASIAN J. INT’L L.].
335. Instructions for Contributors, ASIAN J. INT’L L. (Aug. 27, 2010),
http://journals.cambridge.org/images/fileUpload/documents/ajl_ifc.pdf.
336. The institute that Hazard was involved with was the Russia Institute at Columbia,
since renamed the Harriman Institute. It was founded in 1946 with support from the
Rockefeller
Foundation.
See
History,
HARRIMAN
INST.,
http://www.harrimaninstitute.org/about/history.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
337. To recall the investigations by the House Un-American Activities Committee, see
supra text accompanying note 146.
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home of the Vinogradoff Institute 338 also reflected strategic considerations—a more or less neutral ground on which to develop the Direct
Link—rather than mere chance. Perhaps the alternative, setting up the
‘Link’ directly between the U.S. and Moscow, would have been seen in
the early 1980s as a quasi-official bilateral move not only by the respective parties, but also by outside observers. Alternating research conferences between Moscow and London may have been more palatable to
both the Soviet and Western scholars, freeing them to engage intellectually with one another.
Accordingly, while at first blush the question of the Asian Journal may
appear esoteric, upon closer examination, it is indicative of an important
institutional development in international law. Taking the stated purpose
of the new Asian Journal at its word, the focus of the journal is intended
to cover ‘Asian’ approaches in a broad fashion:
The regional focus of the Journal is broadly conceived. Some articles
may focus specifically on Asian issues; others will bring one of the
many Asian perspectives to bear on issues of global concern. Still others will be of more general interest to scholars, practitioners, and poli339
cymakers located in or working on Asia.

Yet browsing through the list of eminent contributors to the inaugural
issue, one is struck by both the Western-centered nature of the contributions, and the Western origins or the authors. 340 Reflecting on the earlier
discussion regarding the oft-stated goals of new legal research networks
or new journals—as the intellectual homes of alternative frameworks, or
as venues for the publication of otherwise unconventional scholarship—
it is highly unlikely that the contributions of Koskenniemi, Farer, or
Charlesworth could not find voice in any of the usual elite publication
channels. 341 Instead, considering the sum of the outward indicia—the

338. See W.E. Butler, On the Origins of International Legal Science in Russia: The
Role of P. P. Shafirov, 4 J. HIST. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2002).
339. See ASIAN J. INT’L L., supra note 334.
340. Id. Only two out of the eight contributors can be said to be scholars, practitioners,
or policymakers located in or working on Asia.
341. Id. Without speculating on the actual reasons for the inclusion of these highly
esteemed international law publicists in the inaugural issue of the Asian Journal versus
other scholars, it seems somewhat strange that a majority of the invited articles had practically nothing to do with the ostensible main purpose of the Asian Journal, which is to
represent Asian approaches to international law. An Asian Journal of International Law,
1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2011) (“The Asian Journal of International Law aspires to cultivate a conversation between scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers located in or interested in Asia.”).
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theme of the Tokyo conference establishing the journal, 342 the dissemination of the call for submissions to Ivy League U.S. law schools and topflight European schools, the caliber of contributors to the inaugural issue,
the publication venue—one gets the sense that the Asian Society of International Law is seeking to replicate the success of the European Society of International Law, to project relevance to the outside world, to declare that “we too, matter!” Regardless of the merits or likely success of
such an endeavor, it represents a concerted effort by a group of scholars
who already have significant personal intellectual cachet, and who have
now sought to give voice to a particular thought through collective action.
CIL, if it is to have any relevance and recognized disciplinary space,
can offer a sophisticated and empirically grounded analysis of these and
related historical phenomena. Of course, scholars can take an active and
creative approach by organizing these respective conferences, journals,
networks, and think tanks. Yet, whether the actual research methodology
adopted is professional immersion, 343 collaboration, and/or institutional
convergence, 344 the goal of the individual should be to expose the political agenda of the given network. Additionally, if the scholar is the creative agent, the goal should be to set a common agenda, to force participants to make the tragic choices of being in or out, of being part of the
presumed (and hopefully expressly identified) problem, or being part of
the (hopefully expressly and programmatically identified) solution.
What should be clear, the CIL method being proposed here is not a
systematic, objective driven encounter. It is empirical in the sense of collecting institutional data derived from institutional records, systematic
surveys, semi-structured interviews, and ethnographic-style observation.
But it is subjective prima facie, with the express goal not of collecting
samples, per se, but of building political linkages between international
lawyers. It is a knowledge quest, yes, but more importantly, it is an exercise in building political participation. For, by promoting academic exchange and research collaboration, the goal is collaboration and participation in and of itself. The CIL scholar is unable to transcend her own

342. See
Tokyo
Conference
2009,
ASIAN
SOC’Y
INT’L
LAW,
http://law.nus.edu.sg/asiansil/conference/tokyo2009.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (The
conference was titled: International Law in a Multi-polar and Multi-civilizational World
– Asian Perspectives, Challenges and Contributions.).
343. Herbert M. Kritzer, “Research is a Messy Business”: An Archeology of the Craft
of Socio-Legal Research, in CONDUCTING LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH: REFLECTIONS ON
METHODS AND PRACTICES 264 (Simon Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2009) (highlighting themes common to many scholars’ research methods).
344. See text accompanying notes 154–212.
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cultural habitus and immerse herself entirely in the mindset of the foreign internationalist. And that is not the point. The point is twofold: first,
to develop working relationships and common projects with the foreign
internationalist camp; second, to get a basic understanding of that foreign
mindset to be able to present it to one’s students. 345
III. METHODS: CIL AS STUDY OF COMPETING METHODS?
As an alternative to the comparative analysis of ‘soft’ international law
actors and institutions discussed above, CIL is also accurately described
as the study of competing comparative methods. For instance, CIL can
entail the study of the impact of Soviet comparative law in the making of
Western comparative law. Though a full study is outside of the scope of
the present Article, this Section introduces the cross-fertilization between
Soviet and Western comparative law in spite of the strident claims of
incomparability by Soviet bloc comparativists.346 The Section closes
with a discussion on the uses of CIL scholarship and anticipated relevance for those outside of academic circles.
John Quigley’s book on the positive influence of Soviet legal theory on
the development of global international law and the Western domestic
legal order is a good example of the farthest to which Western scholars
acknowledge the influence of Soviet law outside of the socialist bloc.347
Quigley’s central claim is that “[d]espite its rejection of Soviet concepts,
the West absorbed many of them,” offering examples ranging from
women’s suffrage rights, women’s rights in family law, decolonization,
and a host of other positively perceived historical developments. 348 A
logical outgrowth of Quigley’s central thesis is that by rejecting Soviet
exceptionalism and charging the Soviet Union with nihilism, Western
international law learned the effectiveness and utility of exceptionalist
rhetoric.
It should be noted that a comparative law tradition as a distinct discipline did not exist in Soviet jurisprudence.349 From the inception of Soviet

345. Or, more ideally, to be able to attract a foreign internationalist to teach students
how they perceive international law.
346. See SAIDOV, supra note 21, at 27.
347. JOHN QUIGLEY, SOVIET LEGAL INNOVATION AND THE LAW OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 193 (2007).
348. Id.
349. SAIDOV, supra note 21, at 82; cf. Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World:
An Introductory Guide to Classification, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographic
Resources, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 11, 32–33 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) (suggesting that Marxist anthropology is similar to comparative law in its
cross-cultural and historicist features).
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legal theory in the 1920s, there was an ambivalent relationship with the
comparative legal method. 350 On the one hand, comparison was indispensable to understand the peculiar features of the bourgeois states so as
to analyze and heighten the contrast between the Soviet Union and the
West. 351 Comparative law, for instance, was included in the lesson plans
for law faculties, though it was not taught as a separate course to students. 352 John N. Hazard’s lecture notes from courses at Moscow’s Juridical Institute indicate that descriptive contrastive comparison to bourgeois practice was common in practically every course.353
On the other hand, comparison was seen as superfluous to international
law due to the objective/universal nature of historical rules.354 It was log-

350. A brief note about interdisciplinarity in Russian jurisprudence at the turn of the
twentieth century is in order. Russian jurists, for instance, M.M. Kovalevsky and S. Muromtsev, were especially strong in comparative law and sociological method. See М.М.
KOVALEVSKIĬ, SOTSIOLOGIIA [SOCIOLOGY] (1997) (Russ.). Kovalevsky, a renowned Russian sociologist, historian, jurist, and political theorist, was best known for his successful
attempts to develop an inter-disciplinary approach to the study of sociology, merging
elements of biology, geography, economics, and psychology. Kovalevsky’s historicalcomparative method was original in that it merged traditional descriptive comparative
analysis with sociological/ethnographic methods, allowing him to develop pluralistic
approaches to history, sociology, and law. Accordingly, as a jurist, Kovalevsky was able
to develop and teach courses in comparative legal history, comparative history of political organizations, the history of American law, as well as ancient criminal law and procedure. His students went on to establish the first sociology courses in Russian universities,
most notably, the course in “Jurisprudence and Sociology” by Professor Muromtsev
(“Iurisprudentsiita I Sotsiologiia”—S. Мuromtsev). Id. at 9. However, research has not
shown whether the early Soviet jurists relied on Muromtsev or Kovalevsky for their
comparative method.
351. SAIDOV, supra note 21, at 82.
352. See id.
353. John N. Hazard, Letters and Course Notes on Korovin’s International Law 26
(discussing work of League of Nations with respect to Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, China,
Japan, etc.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
354. From the liberal side, the universal nature of justice was the same reason offered
by one of the masters of English comparative law, H.C. Gutteridge, for maintaining a
disciplinary divide between comparative and international law. GUTTERIDGE,
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 171, at 60; H.C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law and the
Law of Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 13 (W.E. Butler,
ed., 1980). In the words of Gutteridge:
If by the law of nations or public international law we understand the principles
of justice, which by the common consent of mankind, should govern relations
between states or nations, the employment of the comparative method would at
first sight appear to be excluded, because rules which are avowedly universal in
character do not lend themselves to comparison.
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ically unnecessary to have a comparative law discipline since the competing bourgeois systems would inevitably self-destroy and become historical relics. 355 For this reason, comparative law scholarship declined in
the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s. 356 Following WWII, when German émigrés brought comparative law to U.S. law schools 357 and comparative law became a distinct (though troubled) discipline, interest in
comparative law in Soviet scholarship was not as pronounced as in the
West. To illustrate, Soviet scholars Iu. Ia. Baskin and D.I. Feldman, in
their 1980 essay on Comparative Legal Research and International Law,
cite Szabo’s 1969 article on comparative law and the 1967 Soviet translation of René David’s Major Legal Systems of the World as the extent of
Soviet literature on the subject.358
More recent research reveals that a distinct Soviet comparative law
style emerged in the 1960s as a result of attempts by Uzbek jurists to apply a comparative method to legal systems of the fifteen Soviet republics.
It was a harmonization project similar to the Common Core project, 359

Id. at 13. Gutteridge saw the intersection of comparative and international law as the
process of inquiring into the existence of “‘general,’ ‘universal’ or ‘common to civilized
nations’” principles and the formulation of methodologies for ascertaining these principles. Id.
355. See SAIDOV, supra note 21, at 82.
356. See id. at 83. However, Saidov is unclear regarding the cause of the decline:
“[T]here were moments of decline in the use of the comparative law method connected
with underestimating the role of quasi-scientific methods and a denial of any moment of
succession in socialist law.” Id. This is curious because with the defeat of Pashukanis and
his disciples and the adoption of stability of laws, Soviet legal scholarship was supposed
to assume a less determinist stance. Thus, comparative law should have remained. Several likely explanations for the disappearance of comparative law from 1930–1960 include
the general decline of interest in the discipline in Europe, though this is not supported by
post-WWII scholarship. Alternatively, the decline of interest may have signified Stalin’s
successful reorientation of Soviet law towards domestic rather than international orientation. Comparative projects would have undermined the stability of laws thesis by demonstrating Soviet deficiencies or excesses, totalitarianism, and the like. The research of this
Article’s co-author, Mamyluk, concludes that comparative projects continued within
individual branches of law but with less vigor and with a greater reliance on overgeneralizations and secondary materials. More research is needed on this issue.
357. For an excellent retelling of the émigré story, see CURRAN, supra note 23, at 9–
14.
358. Iu. Ia. Baskin & D. I. Feldman, Comparative Legal Research and International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 91, 91–93 (W.E. Butler,
ed., 1980) (citing I. Szabo, Sravnitel’noe pravovedenie, in KRITIKA SOVREMENNOI
BURZHUAZNOI TEORII PRAVA 181 (Москва, 1969) [I. Szabo, Comparative Law, in
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY BOURGEOIS THEORY OF LAW 181 (Moscow, 1969)]).
359. For a description of the Common Core project see Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei,
The Common Core Approach to European Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339 (1997).
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but markedly different in that it began from the assumption of harmonized legal systems and sought to identify divergent streams. 360 According to Butler, comparative law began to take on a disciplinary character
(similar to that in the West) in the mid-1980s, led by the contributions of
the Uzbek scholars. 361
Curiously, a review of Soviet literature reveals a lack of a functionalist
or fact based comparative methodology for studying the bourgeois inter360. By 1975, there was a textbook on comparative law in socialist countries. See A.A.
TILLE, SOTSIALISTICHESKOE SRAVNITEL’NOE PRAVOVEDENIE [SOCIALIST COMPARATIVE
LAW] (1975). One theory why Baskin and Feldman downplayed the role of comparative
research in the USSR was probably to maintain the façade of a unitary socialist legal
order, which the USSR on a federal level and vis-à-vis other socialist states certainly
lacked.
361. See W.E. Butler, Editor’s Introduction to SAIDOV, supra note 21, at 1. The formal
agreement between W.E. Butler’s Vinogradoff Institute in London and the Institute of
State and Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Protocol of Cooperation), most likely,
had a greater and more direct influence on the development of comparative law in the last
years of the USSR than one may assume from reading Butler’s modest accounts of these
efforts and his role in them. The results of the first conference under the agreement between the Anglo-American and Soviet academies was the collection of essays published
in COMPARATIVE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 193. Reading these collections
with the hindsight of history and against the backdrop of scholarship on both sides of the
curtain, one is struck by the magnitude of Butler’s pioneering and enormously successful
attempt to bridge the two legal systems. These important bilateral conferences on comparative law, international law, law of the sea, and other substantive fields are discussed
throughout this Article. Surprisingly, Butler, as a true master in the field of comparative
law, international law, and Soviet/Russian/CIS law, his mammoth scholarly contributions, and his continuing work as jurist, statesman, scholar, practitioner, and mediator
have not received their proper due from the new generation of comparativists. See
RETHINKING THE MASTERS, supra note 32 (no acknowledgement of the Hazard, Berman,
or Butler tradition of comparative law; one citation of Harold J. Berman on the topic of
Max Weber; two citations of John Hazard, one as a founder of the International Committee for Comparative Law, the other in Jorge Esquirol’s discussion of the legacy of Rene
David, citing the co-authored work Soviet Law between David and Hazard). This may be
due to Butler’s failure to engage in the theoretical brouhaha on the pages of the American
Journal of Comparative Law, preferring to do comparative law, rather than theorize comparative law (though his contributions to comparative law method have been immense).
Or, it could simply reflect the general disdain of the profession’s mainstream for Soviet
or Russian studies. Nonetheless, the canon is incomplete without acknowledging the
doctrinal and practical contributions of Hazard, Berman, and Butler. For a sample of
Hazard’s classic comparative project, see John N. Hazard, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW:
A SEARCH FOR THE COMMON CORE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MARXIAN SOCIALIST
STATES (1969); JOHN N. HAZARD, SOVIET LAW AND WESTERN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
MANUAL FOR COMPARISON (rev. 2d ed., 1970). The project is not without its faults and is
open to the critique of amateurism (Hazard cites Wigmore and David for panoramic reviews of the other major world systems), but the analysis of Russian sources is superb.
Berman’s later work, and lastly, Butler’s, is remarkably more nuanced and sophisticated.
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national law tradition, aside from pure oppositions derived from Soviet
historical-materialism method. The only comparative method per se was
Marxist-Leninist dialectics, which supposedly gave a model for contrasting different state and legal systems. 362 In a way, historical dialectics can
be compared to the method of comparative legal history, but the methods
are different in a basic way: Marxist historical dialectics was a historically determinist method,363 whereas traditional comparative legal history
was avowedly anti-determinist. 364 This is one reason, for instance, why
historical materialism—while providing an excellent framework for deconstructing Soviet/Russian international legal history and for framing a
comprehensive legal history—fails to answer normative or prescriptive
questions. 365
The Soviet comparative law of the 1980s was not a big improvement
over the prior comparison-by-contrast method. Soviet literature resorted
to familiar clichés about bourgeois law: “bourgeois comparativists do not
conceal the fact that the principal aim of comparative jurisprudence consists of spreading the legal systems of the different capitalist states everywhere.” 366 However, Western comparative law was the one discipline
where the critique was completely inapposite during Soviet times. Western comparativists like Hazard, Berman, and Butler spent entire careers
trying to understand and compare the Soviet system to other systems in
the spirit of cooperation, mutual understanding, and rapprochement. 367
362. V.P. Kazimirchuk, Pravo i Metody Ego Izucheniia [Law & Methods of Its Study]
92 (1965) (citing Baskin & Feldman, supra note 358, at 92).
363. See Jason E. Whitehead, From Criticism to Critique: Preserving the Radical Potential of Critical Legal Studies Through a Reexamination of Frankfurt School Critical
Theory, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701, 727–31 (1998).
364. See id. at 711–12.
365. This is a reference to Soviet hist-mat. Marcuse’s social determinism theory, for
instance, sought to return Marxism to its true path by reinstalling individual responsibility
over historical events. Individual action, and social action as only a collection of individual actions, is the only way to realize transcendent historical possibilities. Faith in automatic historical progression is insufficient. See, e.g., HERBERT MARCUSE, AN ESSAY ON
LIBERATION 63 (1969).
366. Baskin & Feldman, supra note 358, at 92 (citing Kazimirchuk, supra note 362,
without any supporting citation of Western comparative work).
367. The history of the discipline, though with its own blindspots and complicity in
violence, is noticeably softer than the history of international law, if only in rhetoric. H.C.
Gutteridge, for instance, was highly critical of eighteenth century continental jurists who,
in promoting universal adoption of Grotian natural law as the basis for the law of nations,
had undermined the pioneering work of Montesquieu, who had brought to fruition a notion, advanced by Leibnitz, to survey and analyze scientifically the laws of the world.
According to Gutteridge, “the effort to secure recognition for the law of nature carried
with it a tendency to slur over the differences existing between the laws of individual
nations and to belittle their importance.” GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note
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To the extent they critiqued Soviet law, their critiques were wholly legitimate. One could hardly say (other than in the utmost abstract sense)
that they were involved in a grand comparative imperial project.368 The
major contribution of a Marxist critique of ‘bourgeois’ comparative law
was that “bourgeois comparativists . . . contrast only the forms of legal
phenomena, paying no attention to essential social bonds, and subsequently carry over the conclusions derived to essential relations.” 369 The
essential relations, of course, referred to the legal form, the fundamental
nature and function of law, both domestic and international. But other
than raising the critique, the late Soviet jurists did not explore it further
so as not to undermine the then-reached compromise of permanent
peaceful coexistence or reopen the theoretical debates of the interwar
period. The Soviet CIL method was left to comparing the qualitatively
different nature of Soviet treaties with fellow socialist states, 370 divining
general principles of law for ICJ Article 38, 371 comparing domestic implementation regimes, 372 and studying the work of international institutions. Still, the method was invoked and practiced until the demise of the
USSR.
CONCLUSION
CIL cannot be reduced to a set of fundamental unifying legal principles, methodological approaches, or disciplinary aspirations. Rather,
just as the dominant characteristic of comparative law has been (by and
large) by ad hoc muddling through, or sampling of, how different legal
cultures solve difficult legal problems, so has much of international law
scholarship looking at national or regional traditions been of a diffuse

171, at 12; cf. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 206, at 36 (referencing Rabel’s warning,
which may have been said in jest, that upon explorations in foreign territory, “comparatists may come upon ‘natives lying in wait with spears’. . . .”); David J. Gerber, Sculpting
the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and the Façade of Language, in
RETHINKING THE MASTERS, supra note 32, at 190. These are all classic examples.
368. Whether comparativists were involved in a civilizing or imperial project following the collapse of the Soviet Union is another matter. W.E. Butler’s extensive law
reform, privatization, and consulting work throughout the 1990s in the CIS is noteworthy.
In fact, most established Sovietologists were involved in one way or another in postSoviet legal reform.
369. Baskin & Feldman, supra note 358, at 92.
370. Id. at 94.
371. Id. at 95; Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.
372. Baskin & Feldman, supra note 358, at 96.
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character. 373 But this apparent and likely doctrinal incoherence does not
mean that CIL must lack a conceptual or political core.
Since its birth at the dawn of modernity, international law has always
been presented as a discipline with an open universalistic vocation. Because of this flavor it has been contrasted with comparative law, a discipline that, to the contrary, rejects any form of universalism, being in the
core business of locating and analyzing differences. Coherently with
these intellectual premises, the system of international law, being a universal edifice claiming a global scope, cannot be compared with any other system for the simple reason of the lack of alternatives.
Today, these modern assumptions are questioned. On the one hand, we
now know that comparative law alternates between “contrastive” phases,
with emphasis on differences, and “integrative” phases, with emphasis
on analogies. During the integrative phases, claims of universalism are
not absent in this discipline. On the other hand, in recent years, because
of the emphasis of the role of interpreters in the making of the law, the
assumed universalism in international law has been questioned by a variety of new approaches to international law. In this view, international
law is not the same as interpreted in the core and in the periphery, in
Western and non-Western countries, in dominant or in resistant settings.
Hence it becomes possible to compare one vision of international law
with another vision, and such an effort claims its own academic identity
as one of the comparative disciplines, namely comparative international
law.
In this new vision not only it is likely that the two disciplines may benefit from each other, but also that a dialogue between the two can produce important results in terms of overall legal civilization. Indeed, today
there is more than one radically alternative approach to international law;
approaches that consider the current international legal edifice as hopelessly flawed, a hypocritical cover up of a relationship of power that is
entirely characterized by the law of the stronger. Such approaches believe that a different international legal order, genuinely alternative to the
status quo and based on democracy and respect, is not only highly desirable but also necessary in a global political system that is conducting the
world to the final catastrophe.374 This alternative vision, much less

373. See William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L.
963, 964 (2004).
374. Compare CHINA MIÉVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS (2004) (concluding with a
pessimistic assessment of the potential of international legal actors to relinquish their
profitable relationships with international power actors), with Robert Knox, Marxism,
International Law, and Political Strategy, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 413 (2009) (concluding
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grounded in State entities and much more on global people’s movements,
itself makes a global critical claim and consequently finds it very difficult to coexist intellectually with the current status quo based on the rhetoric of the rule of law. 375
This Article sought to contribute to the understanding of the current
clash of radically alternative views about the international legal order and
to contribute in the first steps of the newborn discipline of comparative
international law by telling the story of a time in which not only a completely alternative narrative of international law was available, but also in
which its own claim to universalism was credible and supported by a
powerful legal economic political and military apparatus. In this story,
Soviet international law and “capitalist international law” found a way to
coexist in a turbulent political environment. This is a story of responsibility of a global scholarly community that has contributed with the force of
reason to overcome, at least in part, the reasons of force. The birth of
comparative international law, or at least its first significant archeological layer, must be located in this story and must be fully appreciated to
make sense of the development of a line of inquiry and of scholarly action called “comparative international law.”

that international law can be used in instrumentalist, ‘principled opportunistic’ ways to
advance progressive agendas aimed at ameliorating social problems).
375. MATTEI & NADER, supra note 293, at 2–3.

